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I. INTRODUCTION
This is Part I of a two-part paper on the 2012 National
Administrative Law Judiciary Foundation (NALJF) Fellowship
Topic. The topic is, “A survey of final decision authority among
central panel states with interpretative analysis and policy
implications.” 1
The first part of the paper will explore, analyze, and critique
the arguments for and against final decision authority for central
panel administrative law judges (ALJ). 2 It will also articulate welldocumented concerns regarding the conflicting interests posed by
having the heads of agencies serve as both primary litigants and final

*This paper is dedicated to my friend and mentor, the late John W.
Hardwicke, the first Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Maryland Office
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and one of the pioneers of central panel
adjudication.
1

2012 Fellowship Competition, NAALJ NEWS (Nat’l Ass’n of Admin.
Law Judiciary, Des Moines, Iowa), Jan. 2012, at 10. I presented a very preliminary
preview of this paper to the 2012 National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary (NAALJ) annual conference in New Orleans. In addition, Julian Mann
(Director and Chief ALJ, North Carolina OAH) and I moderated a related panel
discussion of the topic. The panel consisted of Robert S. Cohen, Chief ALJ,
Florida Department of Administrative Hearings; Thomas E. Dewberry, Chief ALJ,
Maryland OAH; Jeff S. Masin, Deputy Chief ALJ, New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law; Ann Wise, Director, Louisiana Office of Administrative Law;
Tom Stovall, Chief ALJ of the Administrative Procedures Division, Tennessee
Secretary of State; Raymond R. Krause, Chief ALJ, Minnesota OAH; Gregory L.
Ogden, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University (who was the reporter for the
Drafting Committee of the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act); and
Ann Marshall Young, Administrative Judge, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
2
The term “administrative law judge” (ALJ) is generally used in this
paper to refer to all administrative adjudication presiding officers—although some
jurisdictions may use different terminology such as “hearing officer,” “hearing
examiner,” “referee,” or some other term. The federal government distinguishes
between ALJs and administrative judges (AJs) presiding in administrative hearings
based on whether the person is an ALJ appointed through the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (federal
APA) or an AJ appointed outside the federal APA procedure. This distinction in
title has no application in state administrative law. Unless otherwise stated or
required by the context, the use of the title “ALJ” in this paper is not a reference to
how (or pursuant to what statute) the ALJ was appointed.
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decision-makers over cases adjudicated by central panel ALJs.
Arguments will be based upon the author’s own two decades of
experience working as an ALJ in Texas—as well as working with
ALJs and state agency heads in his other roles at state agencies—and
on a review of key literature, case law, and commentary on the
subject. Part I of the paper will conclude with a discussion of several
law review articles on final decision authority for central panel ALJs
published in national law journals—two articles each by Professors
James F. Flanagan and Jim Rossi, and an article by Professor James
E. Moliterno. 3 All articles support retention of final decision
authority in the agency head. 4
The second part of this paper will appear in a future issue of
this journal. It will contain a detailed discussion of the debate and
controversy surrounding the Uniform Law Commission’s 5 (ULC)
decision not to include final decision authority for central panel ALJs
as an option for adoption by state legislators in the 2010 Model State

3

See James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative
Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and
Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355 (2002) [hereinafter
Flanagan, Redefining the Role]; James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005)
[hereinafter Flanagan, An Update]; Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal:
Balancing Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 1 (1999) [hereinafter Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal]; Jim Rossi, Final,
but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53
(2004) [hereinafter Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible]; James E. Moliterno, The
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191
(2006).
4
Id. There have also been law review articles and essays supporting the
transfer of final decision authority from the agencies to central panel ALJs. These
are discussed infra at note 184 and accompanying text.
5
The ULC was formerly named the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). See State Administrative
Procedure Act, Revised Model Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=State%20Administrative%20
Procedure%20Act,%20Revised%20Model (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (regarding
the 2010 MSAPA). The 2010 MSAPA was the fourth MSAPA recommended by
this organization. See id. The organization recommended earlier MSAPAs in
1946, 1961, and 1981. Id. Most jurisdictions have a variation of the 1961
MSAPA. In the discussion that follows, the organization will be referred to by the
name it was using in the period under discussion, but the reader should understand
that NCCUSL and the ULC are the same organization.
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Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA). Although the subject of
final decision authority continued to be debated, the full commission
adopted the ULC’s draft in the plenary session. 6
A brief review of the events will provide some context for the
subject of this paper. The debate concerning whether or not to
provide a specific section for optional final decision authority for
central panel ALJs led to organized opposition to the 2010 MSAPA
from three national ALJ groups—the Central Panel Directors
Conference (CPDC), the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary (NAALJ), and the American Bar Association (ABA)
National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary (NCALJ). 7
At the outset of the process of drafting the 2010 MSAPA, the 1997
ABA Model Act for Creation of a Central Hearing Agency (1997
ABA Model Act) was used as a model for drafting sections
pertaining to central panels. 8 The 1997 ABA Model Act contained a
provision specifically allowing the state legislature “the option to
delegate final decision making authority to central panels.” 9 The
ALJ organizations viewed the deletion of that provision from the
2010 MSAPA as a step backward. 10 I had the opportunity to serve as
an ABA section advisor to the drafting committee of the 2010
MSAPA (along with several other ALJs), so I am very familiar with
the drafting committee proceedings. 11

6

Id.
See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2–3 (2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/house_of_deleg
ates/112_2011_my.authcheckdam.pdf.
8
See id. at 3.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
The other ALJ ABA Section Advisors to the drafting committee were
Edward J. Schoenbaum, retired ALJ, Illinois Department of Employment Security
of Springfield, Illinois, representing the ABA’s Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practices Section; Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Senior ALJ in the Colorado
Office of Administrative Courts, and Adjunct Professor at Sturm College of Law in
Denver, Colorado, representing the ABA’s Government and Public Sector Lawyers
Division; and Julian Mann III, Director and Chief ALJ, North Carolina OAH,
representing the ABA’s National Conference of ALJs. I served as an advisor to the
drafting committee on behalf of the ABA’s Judicial Division. In addition,
Professor Asimow, who appointed the original advisors for the ABA’s
7
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In addition to a discussion of the debate surrounding the
central panel-related provisions of the 2010 MSAPA, the second part
of this paper will include up-to-date survey information from all
central panel jurisdictions regarding: (1) the size of the panel, its
historical development, and the scope of its current jurisdiction; (2)
the extent, if any, to which it now has final decision authority; (3) the
source of that authority, whether legislative, through court order, or
by voluntary transfer from line agencies; (4) the extent, if any, to
which final decision authority has been an issue in each jurisdiction;
and (5) related matters. I invite input from readers of the first part of
the paper as to related matters that the survey should cover.
Because the journal publishing this article has an ALJ
orientation, most readers are likely familiar with central panels.
However, a brief definition will provide clarity and context for
purposes of review. Most succinctly, a central panel is an agency of
ALJs established to conduct administrative adjudications for other
agencies. 12 The central panel’s main role is to provide fair
adjudications and due process to both the litigating agencies and the
public. 13 The central panel ALJ is independent of, and not subject to
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practices Section, lists Ann Marshall Young,
AJ of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and former Tennessee Central Panel
ALJ, as one of its advisors to the drafting committee (although her name has been
omitted from the published list of advisors). See Michael Asimow, Contested
Issues in Contested Cases: Adjudication Under the 2010 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L. J. 707, 707 (2011).
12
“A central panel system of administrative law judges (ALJs) is one in
which a central office of administrative hearing employs a staff of ALJs and
assigns them, on the request of administrative agencies, to preside over agency
proceedings.” See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A
Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE
236, 236 (1981) (footnote omitted). Another formal definition of the term “central
panel” is contained in the article by Julian Mann III, Striving for Efficiency in
Administrative Litigation: North Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings, 15
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 151, 155 (1995): “[A] central panel is an
autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive branch agency composed of an independent
cadre of administrative law judges who hear and decide a wide-range of
administrative cases.”
13
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in such “due process revolution”
cases as Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 254 (1970), provided a major incentive for
states to form central panels. See John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing
Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 5, 5–8 (1994); Lori Kyle Endris & Wayne E. Penrod, Judicial
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control or influence by, the agencies for which the ALJ conducts
hearings. 14 Instead, the ALJ reports to a chief ALJ or central panel
director. 15 A few central panels have other related duties such as
publication of the register in which state agency rules are published
for review, comment, and adoption; 16 however, the main duty of all

Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Indiana’s Environmental Solution,
12 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 126–29 (1996). As these authors
explain, Goldberg and related cases greatly expanded the need for fair hearings
presided over by neutral, unbiased adjudicators such as are found in a central panel.
For the first time, the cases required states to provide “some kind of hearing”
presided over by a neutral, unbiased adjudicator before a decision to deprive
citizens of newly expanded property rights became final. These rights were now
held to include many government-conferred benefits such as licenses, welfare
benefits, and government employment. Before Goldberg, the courts had regarded
these benefits as merely governmentally conferred privileges—not property
rights—and held that as mere privileges they were subject to being taken away by
the state without any fair hearing requirement. See William W. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968). After Goldberg, many state legislatures created central panels in
response to the new hearing requirements. The articles mentioned earlier in this
footnote by Hardwick and Endris and Penrod both cite to an influential law review
article on point by Second Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). In his article, Judge Friendly stresses the
importance of an impartial adjudicator and opines that the further the ALJ is
removed from the agency, the greater the likelihood that the hearing will satisfy the
constitutional neutral adjudicator requirement. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, at
1279.
14
See Levinson, supra note 12, at 236–37.
One of the basic purposes of central panel systems is to give
ALJs a certain amount of independence from the agencies over
whose proceedings they preside.
From an organizational
standpoint, this is accomplished by separating the office of
administrative hearings from the agencies and excluding the
agencies from any control over the appointment of ALJs or their
assignment to specific proceedings.
Id.
15

See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 81 (1994) (“The central panel corps in the various
states are headed up by either a chief administrative law judge or a director who is
usually appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate.”).
16
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(1c) (2013) (designating the Chief
ALJ of the OAH or a designee as the “Codifier of Rules”); § 150B-21.1(e) (making
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central panels is to conduct fair and impartial hearings for other
agencies.
As another preliminary matter, because my comments in this
paper are at times based on my own experience, I should state briefly
what that experience has been. Most pertinently, I served for more
than twenty years as the ALJ for the Texas Finance Commission, an
“umbrella agency” which oversees and coordinates the activities of
the Texas Department of Banking, the Texas Department of Savings
and Mortgage Lending, and the Office of Consumer Credit
Commissioner of Texas. In addition, I was a contract-hearing officer
conducting Special Education Due Process Hearings for the Texas
Education Agency for approximately five years.
Earlier this year, following forty-nine years of practice, I
retired to an “of counsel” position with the Austin law firm of
Craddock and Noelke, PLLC, which specializes in contract ALJ
work for Texas state agencies. I have conducted many hearings, but
have never conducted hearings for a central panel. Texas is a central
panel state, but the hearings that I conducted were on subject matters
or for agencies outside the central panel’s jurisdiction. All of my
decisions for the Finance Commission agencies were subject to
agency head review on both facts and law before a final decision was
issued. However, to the best of my knowledge, the agencies never
changed my fact-findings. I had final decision authority in the
contract Special Education Due Process Hearings I conducted for the
Texas Education Agency.
My background also includes eight years doing trial and
appellate work, in state and federal court, representing state agencies
and officials as an Assistant Attorney General of Texas and serving
on the Attorney General’s Opinion Committee; twelve years as an aid
to three Texas governors (including roughly five years as Assistant
General Counsel to the Governor); more than five years as an aid to
the Texas Comptroller (including three years as his General
Counsel); and a year as Chief Legal Advisor to the Public Utility
Commission of Texas.

the Chief ALJ of the OAH or the designee responsible for publication of the Rules
in the North Carolina Register).
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SPLIT-DECISION AUTHORITY

Before sending a final draft of this paper to the NAALJ
Journal for publication, I circulated it to administrative adjudication
experts for review and comment. The reviewers included the current
members of the NAALJ Journal Board of Advisors and members of
the CPDC. The comments I received gave me the opportunity to see
some reaction to what I originally wrote, and, in some instances,
surprised me. I have revised the paper to respond to some of these
comments and will from time to time refer to them in the paper as
comments by early reviewers of the paper.
I had originally planned to defer the discussion of “splitdecision authority” to the second part of the paper as part of the
discussion of the development of the 2010 MSAPA, since splitdecision authority was an issue raised at several points in the drafting
sessions. 17 However, after reading the comments, I have decided to
place the discussion of split-decision authority in this first part of the
paper instead of postponing the discussion.
Two early reviewers of the paper were law professors. In
reading the paper, they understood me to argue that either the agency
head or the ALJ should have final decision authority on both facts
and law in every case and that there is no middle ground.
One of the law professors stated:
[The paper] . . . makes agency-head review of ALJ
decisions an all-or-nothing matter. There could be
agency-head review, but within certain constraints or
agency decisions reversing ALJs could be subjected to
more rigorous judicial review. My understanding is
that in North Carolina, if the agency head modifies or
overturns the ALJ’s decision, the court will review the
record de novo. Indeed, the author alludes to some
proposals to limit agency-head reviewing power, but
does not challenge those proposals. Indeed, the author
does not critique the current North Carolina approach
to agency-head reversal. So even if the author has
convincingly established that a regime of agency-head

17

Usually, I was the one who raised it.
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review under no constraints should be rejected, he has
not grappled with the more difficult question of
whether it makes sense under some constraint. 18
I need to clarify my position on the split-decision authority
issue. In Part I of the paper as originally circulated, I did not discuss
split-decision authority at all, and so the professor was drawing an
inference about what my opinion is on the split-authority issue. To
make that opinion perfectly clear, I believe final decision authority
can properly be split so that the ALJ has final authority to decide
facts and the agency head has final authority to decide policy
issues. 19
One of the law professor reviewers correctly noted that my
home state of Texas splits final decision authority between the central
panel ALJ (who has final decision authority over facts) and the
agency head (who has final decision authority over policy issues).
Texas has followed this split-decision making model since it became
a central panel state and, in the opinion of many, it has worked well
over the years. Under the original Texas statutes enacting this model
into law, the central panel ALJ’s fact-findings and conclusions of law

18

This reviewer is correct as to what North Carolina required at one time
whenever the agency changed the central panel ALJ’s decision on either facts or
law. However, the North Carolina statute has now been amended to give central
panel ALJs final decision authority without agency review. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
150B-34(a) (2012). Effective January 1, 2012, the statutory law of North Carolina
was amended to revise § 150B-34(a) of the General Statutes titled Final Decision
Order, to read as follows:
(a) In each contested case the administrative law judge shall
make a final decision or order that contains findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The administrative law judge shall decide
the case based upon the preponderance of the evidence, giving
due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the
agency with respect to facts and inferences within the specialized
knowledge of the agency.
Id.
19

The law is for the reviewing court to apply de novo giving great
deference to the agency’s interpretations of its enabling statute and to any properly
promulgated agency rules and regulations.
See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5:28(4), 11:32(1) (3d ed. 2010).
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were subject to agency review and modification only for reasons of
policy. 20 This model has been the subject of several excellent law
review articles. 21 In recent years, the Texas statutes setting forth this
model have been amended to specify the reasons that an agency head
can change central panel ALJ fact-findings with greater
particularity. 22 These specific reasons are:
(1) [T]he [ALJ] did not properly apply or interpret
applicable law, agency rules, written policies . . . or
prior administrative decisions;
(2) [A] prior administrative decision on which the
[ALJ] relied is incorrect or should be changed; or
(3) [A] technical error in a finding of fact should be
changed. 23
A 2012 Texas CLE panel presentation discussed, among other
issues, why the legislature reworded the original Texas statutes
allowing agencies to modify central panel decisions for policy
reasons. 24 It was because, during review, the heads of litigating
agencies proposed decisions of central panel ALJs, and sometimes
the courts had difficulty understanding and consistently applying the
Texas statutes related to the fact/policy distinction under the statutes
as originally worded. 25 The primary reason for rewording the
original language was to make it easier for the agencies and the

20

See Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings:
Establishing Independent Adjudications in Contested Case Proceedings While
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 119 (2005); F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency
Change the Findings or Conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 BAYLOR
L. REV. 65 (1998); F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change
the Findings or Conclusions of an ALJ?: Part II, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 63 (1999).
21
See id.
22
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (West 2013).
23
Id.
24
See John M. Hohengarten, Dudley D. McCalla, & Jon Eugene Porter,
Jr., 7th Annual Advanced Administrative Law Seminar at the University of Texas
School of Law: Should SOAH Make Final Decisions (Aug. 31, 2012). No paper
was prepared for this seminar topic and the text statement above is based on my
recollection and notes of the panel debate.
25
Id.
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courts to consistently apply review standards limiting agency
authority to change ALJ fact-findings. 26
As I expect will be shown in the survey in Part II of this
paper, many other states have adopted statutory provisions similar to
the ones in Texas to restrict agency authority to overturn central
panel ALJ fact-findings. This would reflect information contained in
the Central Panel Directors letter to the head of the ULC complaining
of the ULC’s failure to include discretionary authority for ALJs in
the 2010 MSAPA. 27 In this regard, the Central Panel Directors
wrote:
Nearly every jurisdiction that presently has a central
panel provides in some measure for the option of final
decision making by central panel judges. Some
jurisdictions have granted total final decision authority
to the central panel but most jurisdictions have a
combination or a hybrid of recommended and final
orders. 28
I have no problem with the split-decision structure if it works
satisfactorily in the jurisdictions that have adopted it, and do not
mean to suggest otherwise in this paper. Indeed, I fought for the
split-decision model in the development of the portion of the 2010
MSAPA related to central panel adjudication. However, this was one
of the issues on which the drafting committee did not follow my
recommendations.
Because I knew that Professor Ron Beal of the Baylor
University Law School was a strong advocate of this model, I
contacted him and urged him to present his views on the benefits of
the split-decision model to the 2010 MSAPA drafting committee.
Professor Beal presented these views in writing to the drafting
committee, in part, as follows:

26

See id.
Letter from Peter Plummer, Head of the Central Panel Directors
Conference, to the Unif. Law Comm’n (July 6, 2010) (on file with author).
28
Id. (emphasis added).
27
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I believe that ad law in Texas has fundamentally
changed for the better by having the ALJ being the
final authority on basic, underlying facts. At least [I
would] suggest to [the drafting committee] they put
this in [the 2010 MSAPA] as an alternative for states
who want to truly have an independent but
interdependent . . . [central panel/agency head]
decision or order. 29
Professor Gregory L. Ogden of Pepperdine University School
of Law, in his role as the reporter for the 2010 MSAPA, transmitted
Professor Beal’s comments to the drafting committee, along with
Professor Ogden’s own comments, as follows:
[N]o change [to add language that incorporates
Professor Beal’s suggestion in the 2010 MSAPA] [is]
recommended. The existing approach [in the draft
2010 MSAPA] is consistent with the Universal
Camera federal standard. This proposal [to make the
ALJ the final authority on the facts] would . . . make
ALJ fact determinations almost unreviewable by the
agency head rather than giving deference to the ALJ
fact findings based on demeanor evidence and
credibility determinations. 30
Professor Ogden’s recommendation—rather than my
recommendation and Professor Beal’s recommendation on this
point—was adopted by the drafting committee and by the ULC in the
final 2010 MSAPA.
To clarify my position in this paper: If faced with the option
of vesting all final decision authority in the neutral central panel ALJ
or in the agency head, I would support placing it all in the neutral
central panel ALJ based on the arguments stated throughout this
29

Gregory L. Ogden, MSAPA Drafting Committee Agenda for February
12 to 14, 2010 Meeting, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION 20–21,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state_administrative_procedure/msapa_de
tailed%20agenda_021210.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
30
Id.
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paper. I do not oppose the split-decision model used in Texas and
other jurisdictions. It seems to be working well in some states,
including Texas.
Although I felt strongly at the time the 2010 MSAPA was
developed that the split-decision model was the best option for
central panel adjudication, as I have studied the issue more fully, I
have come to the view that, perhaps, the best option would be to fully
develop the record on all issues, let the central panel ALJ write a
final decision, and let the agency and/or the private litigant appeal to
the courts if unhappy with the decision.
The information to be provided in the survey results should
shed further light on this matter. It will be interesting to see what the
experience has been in the central panel jurisdictions on the splitdecision option versus the option to place all final decision authority
on facts and law in either the central panel ALJ or in the litigating
agencies.
III.

MAIN ISSUE PRESENTED

The questions at the heart of this paper are simple:
Should an agency head finally decide cases that a neutral
central panel ALJ adjudicates when the agency’s staff has actively
prosecuted or defended the case; or, alternatively, should the central
panel ALJ who adjudicates the case make the final decision without
agency review subject to an appeal to the courts by the losing party?
More pointedly, in The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and
Implementation in Maryland, Judge John W. Hardwicke refers to the
central panel ALJ as “the hearer,” and he stated this issue as follows:
If, in principle, it is necessary to separate the hearer
from the agency, is fundamental fairness sacrificed by
permitting the agency to superimpose its will upon the
final result? 31

31

John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and
Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 5, 9 (1994).
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I will assume for purposes of this paper that the losing
party—be it a private party or the administrative agency itself—will
have a right to appeal an adverse ALJ decision to the courts. 32
IV.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE FEDERAL APA; CREATION OF
THE ALJ POSITION

The federal APA was unanimously adopted by Congress in
1946 following almost a decade of rancorous debate that was
interrupted by World War II. 33 The resulting legislation is seen today

32

In the state of Louisiana, the agency cannot appeal if the central panel
ALJ holds against the agency. However, I know of no other jurisdiction that is
seeking to structure ALJ finality in the same way as Louisiana. Therefore, I will
not argue about whether ALJ final authority with no appeal for the agency should
or should not be the law. I think the subject has pretty much been exhausted in the
Louisiana Supreme Court case of Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance
Co., 893 So. 2d. 746 (La. 2005), the law review articles discussing the Wooley
case, and the underlying Louisiana statute. See Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise,
ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s
Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431 (1999); April L. Rolen-Ogden,
When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World: Wooley v. State Farm—Does a
Denial of Agency Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ Final Orders Violate the
Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 66 LA. L. REV. 885 (2005);
Edward P. Richards & Kelly M. Haggar, Administrative Finality and the Pelican
State: A Recipe for Central Panel Gumbo, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (Am. Bar
Ass’n), 2005, at 4; see also Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 410–18
(discussing Wooley); MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 136–37 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Wooley and
related issues); James F. Flanagan, Developments in State Administrative Law—
Central Panels Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., AM. BAR ASS’N
(Apr.
19,
2005),
http://apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/spring2005/Flanagan_outline.doc
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2013). People interested in the final central panel ALJ decision
with no agency appeal issue should read those materials. As Ann Wise, director of
the Louisiana Central Panel, correctly points out, the Wooley decision is well
written and self-explanatory. Ann Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative
Law: An Independent Hearings Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1194 n.84 (2008).
33
See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59
(1996); Michael Asimow, Administrative Law Judges: The Past and the Future,
N.Y. STATE ADMIN. LAW JUDGES ASS’N, http://www.nysalja.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/aljpastandfuture.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013); Arthur
Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297,

486

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

as a political compromise between the New Dealers (who wanted
agencies to have almost unfettered authority to exercise control over
the economy), and the “judicialists” (who wanted to assure that all
agency authority was exercised in strict conformity with stringent
due process requirements). 34 The New Dealers viewed the
judicialists and all but very minimal due process requirements as
obstructing the reforms needed to preserve and strengthen the
American economy. 35 The New Dealers viewed the very ability of
the American economy to survive the Great Depression to be at stake
in the battle with the judicialists over administrative procedural
requirements. 36
These circumstances begin to get at the root of the debate that
caused such rancor over the 2010 MSAPA. One of the questions that
we, as a profession, might ask in reviewing the final decision for
central panel issue is whether the limitations on due process thought
to have been appropriate at the national level when the very future of
the nation’s economy was thought to be in jeopardy are still
appropriate in central panel state administrative adjudication today.
The overriding belief of the New Dealers, which became part of the
background for the compromise incorporated in the 1946 federal
APA was that, unless due process shortcuts were taken, the national
economy would irrevocably crumble. 37 This was a strong argument
during the depression of the 1930s, less so by 1946 with post-war
boom in the U.S. economy beginning to get underway, and is of little
if any weight today when considering a state rather than a federal
APA. Given that such concerns are not in play in state central panel
adjudications, it is worth revisiting the issue of the extent to which
agency control over policy should take precedence over providing a
fair adjudication to both the agency and individual litigants in those
adjudications. As a profession, we may need to ask whether it is time
to consider readjusting the scales.

298 (1986); JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59–108 (2012).
34
See Asimow, supra note 33; see also Shepherd, supra note 33, at 1678.
35
See Asimow, supra note 33, at 1559, 1561–62.
36
See id.
37
See id.; Shepherd, supra note 33.
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Many would argue that it is. In his paper, Tracing the Unique
Contours of Administrative Justice: Reconceptualizing the Judicial
Model for Administrative Law, David E. Guinn writes that, “Having
agency supervisors alter an ALJ’s factual determination would both
appear and would in fact interfere with the party’s right to a fair and
impartial hearing.” 38
I come at this argument with a clear point of view. Mr. Guinn
is undoubtedly right about what fairness requires. I also believe that
eventually all central panel states are likely to make it more difficult
for agency heads to overturn central panel ALJ fact-findings. The
rationale here is simple. With a neutral final decision-maker now
available in the central panel states, if one were starting over from
scratch, why would one place a litigant in charge of the final
decision? This may have been appropriate when the federal system
was originally designed and the necessity of dealing quickly and
efficiently with the economic problems brought about by the Great
Depression and World War II justified—or were used to justify—the
near infringement on rights of the regulated community; but are such
infringements now necessary or appropriate in modern-day central
panel state administrative adjudication?
Historians trace the origin of the ALJ position to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1906 to 1907. 39 The ICC, pursuant
to statutory authorization by Congress, appointed agency staff
members as hearing examiners to take evidence when the
commissioners were too busy attending to other duties to personally
hear the evidence. 40 After the hearing, the examiner made a report to
the ICC that contained a summary of the evidence and sometimes the
examiner’s recommendations about how the commission should
decide the case. 41 By 1917, these reports were usually, if not always,

38

David E. Guinn, Tracing the Unique Contours of Administrative
Justice: Reconceptualizing the Judicial Model for Administrative Law 20 (Sept. 26,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017306.
39
See Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H. Koch, Jr., Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS &
REPORTS 799 (1992).
40
See id.
41
See id.
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written and had more or less assumed the format of today’s ALJ
recommended decisions. 42 Traditionally, ALJs have been part of an
agency’s staff and subject to the agency’s control. Prior to the
federal APA’s enactment in 1946 (and still in some state agencies
and in some federal agencies not subject to the federal APA), they
sometimes had—and still have—other duties in addition to presiding
in administrative hearings. 43
The use of in-house ALJs to perform duties other than
presiding in administrative hearings has been discontinued in the
agencies subject to the federal APA. 44 The federal APA now
contains several provisions designed to keep an in-house ALJ
insulated from improper influences by his or her employing agency. 45
These provisions include merit selection of ALJs through competitive
examination by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which
sends the agency a list of the top three candidates from which the

42
43

See id.
See id. at 799–800 (footnotes omitted):

The roles and duties of examiners [the early designation for
ALJs] were not always clearly confined to a purely judge-like
role during the several decades prior to enactment of the APA.
Although examiners generally tended to preside over trial-type
hearings for the agencies, they sometimes performed
investigatory duties and, in some agencies, they consulted
extensively with superiors about how cases before them should
be decided. Writing 9 years after the FTC was established,
Henderson (the historian of the FTC) observed that it was then
customary for the precomplaint investigation of a case to be
conducted by one of the Commissioner’s examiners.
Henderson’s report of this use of examiners shows that
examiners were not then viewed as personnel committed solely
to judging, but were apparently considered to be open to a wider
range of tasks . . . . The practice of examiners consulting with
agency officials about proposed reports was also followed
extensively in the ICC’s Bureau of Formal Cases.
44

“Administrative law judges . . . may not perform duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges.” 5 U.S.C. §
3105 (2006).
45
See 5 U.S.C. § 1305; 5 C.F.R. Part 930, Subpart B–Administrative Law
Judge Program (2013).
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agency must choose an ALJ. 46 Further, under the federal APA, pay
raises are not controlled by the federal agency employing the ALJ,
but by the OPM. 47 Finally, federal ALJs may not be supervised by
agency staff with prosecutorial or investigative responsibilities. 48
Despite precautions to prevent undue influence on the ALJ by
the agency, the public remains skeptical. As Bernard Segal, a past
president of the ABA, explained:
[There is an] unavoidable appearance of bias when an
administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is
presiding in litigation by that agency against a private
party. One can fill the pages of the United States
Code with legislation intended to guarantee the
independence of the administrative law judge; but so
long as that judge has offices in the same building as
the agency staff, so long as the seal of the agency
adorns the bench on which that judge sits, so long as
that judge’s assignment to the case is by the very
agency whose actions or contentions that judge is
being called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for that judge to convey the image of
an impartial fact finder. 49
Moreover, despite the federal APA’s intended separation of
federal ALJs from improper agency influences in deciding cases,
there have been numerous credible assertions, some supported by
judicial findings, that federal agencies have failed to honor the
separation provisions and have attempted to interfere with ALJ
independence. 50

46

5 C.F.R. § 930.204.
5 C.F.R. § 930.205.
48
“The employee who presides at the reception of evidence . . . may not—
. . . (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2006) (footnote omitted).
49
Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of
Progress and the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1426 (1976).
50
See Mahoney v. Donovan, 721 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Mahoney
was an ALJ for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
47
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Attempts by state agency personnel to intimidate state agency
ALJs to decide in favor of the agency have also apparently been quite
common. 51

See id. at 634. He alleged among other infractions of the Federal APA that: HUD
had assigned cases based on likelihood of favorable ruling for the agency rather
than randomly; his superiors had ex parte communications with private litigants
regarding the management of cases pending on his docket without giving him
notice or the opportunity to participate; his superiors had withdrawn staff support in
retaliation for his reporting APA violations to federal officials authorized to take
action against agency misconduct; and they were notifying the Justice Department
of upcoming cases before private parties were notified thereby giving the
government an unfair advantage. See id. at 634 n.1; Mahoney v. Donovan, 824 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d in part, 721 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Federal trial and appellate courts held that ALJ Mahoney lacked standing to raise
these issues and that some of them were not timely raised and were barred by
limitations. See also Debra Cassens Moss, Judges Under Fire—ALJ Independence
at Issue, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, at 56, 56–57 (1991). Department of Interior Chief
ALJ McKenna alleged that in retaliation for his testimony to Congress and in a
grievance proceeding against the Department of Interior (DOI), his DOI superiors
initiated a reduction in force (RIF) action to eliminate his job. See also McKenna
v. Dept. of the Interior, No. 92-3520, 1993 WL 142069 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 1993). A
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) ALJ held a hearing on McKenna’s claim.
The MSPB ALJ found that ALJ McKenna’s immediate superiors had initiated the
RIF because they “harbor[ed] animosity” towards McKenna, but this animosity did
not invalidate the RIF because the ALJ’s superiors did not have authority to carry it
out and approval of the action by the Secretary of the Interior was not shown to be
motivated by animosity toward McKenna but was permissible as a legitimate
reduction in force action. See id. at *1–2. This decision was affirmed on appeal.
McKenna v. Dept. of the Interior, 996 F.2d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Daniel
F. Solomon, Fundamental Fairness, Judicial Efficiency and Uniformity: Revisiting
the Administrative Procedure Act, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 52,
63–66 (2013) (regarding the actions taken against Social Security ALJs during the
Carter administration to intimidate them to rule against recovery by claimants);
DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING
PROCESS 182 (Greenwood Press 1985) (reporting that in her 1982 nationwide
survey of Social Security ALJs, seventy percent of the respondents reported they
had received pressure from the Social Security Administration to deny more claims
for recovery against the Social Security trust fund).
51
See, e.g., Erick Williams, Off the Record: Michigan’s Ex Parte Law
Needs Reform, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 24 (2002), available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article387.pdf.
In his article, Erick
Williams, a state ALJ, complained of the use of command influence by
administrative agency heads at the Michigan Department of Corrections to pressure
ALJs to rule in favor of the Department and against those challenging the agency.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE MODEL STATE APAS
(MSAPAS)

Unlike the federal APA, which was hammered out amidst
turmoil as a compromise between New Dealers and the judicialists
(with the ABA on the side of the judicialists), the first MSAPA in
1946 was developed in a far more leisurely manner as a NCCUSL
and ABA joint product. 52 Early drafts were widely circulated to state

See id. at 28–29. In response to Erick Williams’s article, a state assistant attorney
general (Assistant AG) argued that a state ALJ is not a real judge. See Michael
Lockman, Speaking Out: Off the Record—Michigan’s Ex Parte Law Needs Reform,
MICH. B.J., May 2002, at 48, 48 (quoting Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Pers. Dir.
of State, 402 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)). Therefore, the Assistant AG
argued, ex parte attempts to influence the ALJ’s decision by agency supervisors
were not only permissible but, in fact, the agency heads were just doing their jobs
in pressuring ALJs to rule for the agency in the individual contested cases that
came before them for decision. See id. A second commenter also challenged the
factual allegations made by Williams. See id. at 49; see also Ronnie A. Yoder, The
Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 322
(2002) (discussing other cases in which state ALJs were disciplined for ruling
against their agencies and in favor of private parties); see also Ed Hein, Alaska
ALJ, Remarks Before the Alaska State Legislature Joint Committee on
Administrative Regulation Review (Feb. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HARR2003-02-190858.PDF.
Mr. Hein
testified that,
An inherent conflict always exists when a hearing officer is
employed [as an in-house agency employee]. He [or she] has the
same supervisor as the person issuing the initial determinations
[of violations or denial of an application or permit]. His [or her]
supervisor understands that [the ALJ] will disagree with [the
initial agency determination and rule against the agency] at times.
However, agency administrators are not always that enlightened.
[Hein] has heard many stories at national conferences where
hearing officers are pressured into changing their decisions.
Hearing officers have quotas and cannot side against the
[employing] agency too often.
Id. at 13–14.
52
See Albert S. Abel, The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure
Legislation: Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IOWA L. REV. 228, 229 (1948)
(discussing the differences between the model act and federal act in administrative
procedure legislation).
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and local bar associations and to academics for comments and
suggestions. 53 Insofar as has been reported, there were no hotly
debated issues in the drafting of the 1946 MSAPA. 54 Instead, the
1946 APA seems to have been a consensus government reform
measure fully supported by both NCCUSL and the ABA. 55 Its
adoption was postponed until after Congress adopted the federal
APA to make certain that the MSAPA meshed with the final federal
APA. 56
Although compatible with the federal APA, from the first
MSAPA in 1946 to the fourth and most recent MSAPA in 2010, the
MSAPAs have never been identical to the federal APA. 57 Two law
review articles comparing the federal APA and the MSAPAs
observed that the MSAPAs have only a “cousinly” rather than a more
direct family resemblance to the federal APA. 58 Professor Michael
Asimow, an expert in administrative law, has declared that in drafting
a state APA, the draftsman should be aware of the provisions of the
federal APA, should borrow from those provisions which have
worked well, and should avoid provisions which have not worked so
well. 59 Professor Asimow does not contend that the draftsman of a
state APA has any obligation to follow the federal APA except
insofar as he or she chooses to do so. 60

53

Id.
Id. at 229–33.
55
Id.
56
Bonfield, supra note 33, at 298.
57
Id.
58
Abel, supra note 52, at 229; Bonfield, supra note 33, at 302.
59
See Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act on California’s New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.
REV. 297, 297 (1996).
60
Id. Professor Asimow writes:
54

A reformer who sets out to modernize a state’s APA
necessarily turns first to . . . the Federal APA. The pathways of
that statute are embedded in every administrative lawyer’s mental
map. If a federal provision seems to have worked well, that
provision is the logical starting point in drafting a state law. If
the provision has generated major problems in application, that
lesson should also be taken to heart.
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Dean E. Blythe Stason of the University of Michigan School
of Law chaired the MSAPA drafting committees for both the 1946
and the 1961 MSAPAs. 61 Frank E. Cooper assisted in the drafting of
the 1961 MSAPA as a staff consultant (probably the same position
that the ULC now calls “reporter”—the person who does the actual
drafting under the drafting committee’s guidance). 62 Dean Stason
previously worked on the 1941 U.S. Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure and was part of the three-member
coalition filing a minority report. 63 Stason helped draft proposed
legislation to accompany the minority coalition report. 64 That draft
legislation, with revision, eventually morphed into the federal APA. 65
VI.

THE BENJAMIN REPORT: “CENTRAL PANELS WITHOUT FINAL
DECISION AUTHORITY DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH”; RELATION
BETWEEN FACT-FINDING AND POLICY

The earliest reference to the central panel ALJ final decision
authority issue is contained in the 1942 Benjamin Report, written by
Robert M. Benjamin. 66 The Benjamin Report was a major influence
on the 1946 MSAPA. 67 It was the first comprehensive study of state
administrative law in any jurisdiction, and its suggestions were of
value far beyond the State of New York. 68
Largely forgotten today, Robert M. Benjamin was a
distinguished and well-known lawyer in his day. 69 After service in
World War I as an infantry captain, he entered Harvard Law School

Id.
61

Bonfield, supra note 33, at 300.
See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW viii (1965).
63
Bonfield, supra note 33, at 300.
64
COOPER, supra note 62, at 6–7.
65
Id.
66
ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HERBERT H. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942).
67
COOPER, supra note 62, at 6–7.
68
See id. at 5 n.5.
69
Robert M. Benjamin Dies at 69; Lawyer Served as State Official;
Moreland Act Commissioner had Headed Regents Unit—Aided Hiss Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1966, at 33.
62
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and graduated in 1922. 70 He then clerked for U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes before entering private law practice. 71
In the later years of his career, he headed the team of appellate
lawyers who represented Alger Hiss on his appeal from a perjury
conviction for lying to the House Un-American Activities Committee
(HUAC) in hearings concerning Hiss’s alleged espionage activity. 72
This was a cause célèbre and the case that first brought HUAC
member Richard M. Nixon to national attention. 73 In mid-career,
Benjamin accepted an appointment by New York Governor Herbert
H. Lehman as a special commissioner under New York’s Moreland
Act to study administrative adjudication in the State of New York. 74
The prefatory notes for the first and second MSAPAs (the
1946 and 1961 MSAPAs) acknowledge the influence and importance
of the Benjamin Report in drafting these model acts. 75 As already
discussed, Frank E. Cooper (the author of a 1965 two-volume treatise
on state administrative law) declared the Benjamin Report to be the

70

Id.
Id.
72
Mr. Benjamin is shown as lead counsel in the court papers. See, e.g.,
ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ALGER HISS, PETITIONER, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
U.S. SUPREME COURT TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD WITH SUPPORTING PLEADINGS
(Gale 2011), http://www.amazon.com/Petitioner-America-Transcript-SupportingPleadings/dp/1270372238 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
73
See Jennie Weber, Nixon and the Alger Hiss Case, AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS
BLOG
(Dec.
2,
2008),
http://www.americanpresidents.org/2008/12/nixon-and-alger-hiss-case.html?m=1; see also Douglas
Linder,
The
Alger
Hiss
Trials:
An
Account,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/hiss.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
74
See Robert M. Benjamin Dies at 69, supra note 69. In addition to the
accomplishments listed above, Benjamin served on the Board of Regents of the
New York State Educational Department and the Board of Directors of the
American Judicature Society. At the time of his death, he was chairman of an
ABA special committee on a proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure
to replace the federal Administrative Procedure Act and was a member of the
Board of Directors of the American Bar Foundation. He was also on the Board of
Trustees of the Practising Law Institute (PLI). Id.
75
See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § Ref. & Annos., U.L.A. 175–76
(1961); see also MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § Ref. & Annos., U.L.A. 174–
76 (1946).
71
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first serious and comprehensive study of state administrative law. 76
He also compared it favorably to the 1941 Final Report of the
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (Final
Report)—the primary study underlying the federal APA. 77 In a panel
discussion celebrating the 40th anniversary of the federal APA,
Walter Gellhorn, who headed the staff that produced the 1941 Final
Report, brought up Benjamin’s name and the Benjamin Report and
acknowledged the parallels between the Final Report and the
Benjamin Report. 78
The Benjamin Report consists of six volumes. 79 Its focus is
on administrative adjudication as conducted in New York at the time
that Benjamin and his assistants conducted the study and wrote the
report (roughly 1939–1942). 80 Five of the volumes describe and
analyze the adjudication procedures employed by each of the major
New York state agencies. 81 The sixth volume is unnumbered and is a
summary volume containing Benjamin’s recommendations on how
state administrative adjudication could be improved. 82
In the Benjamin Report’s summary volume, Benjamin
discusses the concepts of final decision authority for central panels. 83
None of these central panels were yet in existence—anywhere—and
the name “central panel” had not yet been coined. Nonetheless,
Benjamin considered and discussed the central panel concept and
final decision authority. Benjamin said that if such panels were
created, they should be given final decision authority. 84 Benjamin
reached this conclusion through the following logic:

76

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See COOPER, supra note 62, at 10.
78
Walter Gellhorn, Kenneth Culp Davis, & Paul Verkuil, Present at the
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 516 (1986).
79
Reprinted in three cloth bound volumes by William S. Hein and Co.
(2001), available at http://www.lawbookexchange.com/pages/books/32150/robertm benjamin/administrative-adjudication-in-the-state-of-new-york-6-vols.
80
Benjamin was appointed in 1939 and published the report in 1942.
BENJAMIN, supra note 66.
81
Id. at 65–66.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
77
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Another suggestion, with which I disagree, calls for
brief mention. The suggestion is that all hearings be
conducted by trial examiners appointed by, and
subject to removal only by, some agency independent
of . . . [the agency litigating with the private citizen or
company]. If the decisions of such independent trial
examiners were, as is sometimes suggested, given
finality (subject only to judicial review), the change
would be not merely a change in internal organization;
the trial examiners would constitute an independent
adjudicating agency . . . . If, on the other hand, the
decisions of such trial examiners were not given
finality, the change in internal organization would not
go far enough towards accomplishing the purpose of a
separation of functions. The existence of . . . [the
head of the litigating agency’s] ultimate power to
review and reverse would, even if it were not
frequently exercised, tend to impair the confidence in
impartial adjudication which it is a primary purpose of
the separation of functions to foster. In any case
where . . . [the agency litigating with the private
citizen or company] actually reversed a decision of the
trial examiner favorable to the respondent, the very
fact of the trial examiner’s independence would
aggravate the objection to the [head of the litigating
agency’s] duality of function. 85
Benjamin was not alone in this line of argument. An
unpublished essay by Allen C. Hoberg, Director of the North Dakota
Central Panel, contains reasoning parallel to Benjamin’s reasoning.86
Hoberg writes:

85

Id.
Allen C. Hoberg, Final Decision Making By Hearing Officers 1–2
(unpublished memorandum) (Dec. 11, 2003) (on file with author). Hoberg is the
longtime director of the North Dakota Central Panel. He wrote this memorandum
at the request of the Advisory Committee to the North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings and made it available to me to use in writing this paper.
86
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The appearance of fairness should extend not only to
the decision maker in the first instance (at the hearing
and recommended decision stage) but also to the final
decision stage. Certainly, it is beneficial and appears
to be fair, to have a hearing conducted by, and the
recommended decision issued by, an independent HO.
Yet, that appearance of fairness can be compromised
when the final decision maker is the agency head [of
the agency litigating against the private citizen].87
Law review articles arguing in favor of agency head authority
to overturn the ALJ fact-findings often argue that the agency heads
need final decision authority to make certain the ALJ correctly
applies agency policy to the facts of each case. 88 However, the
Benjamin Report makes an observation that these critics have failed
to address. Benjamin writes:
There are many matters within the scope of agency
adjudication in which policy plays a proper, and often
a necessary, part. It may play such a part in
interpreting a statute which the administrator is
charged with enforcing, or in determining the penalty
that should be imposed for a particular offense, or in
determining the course of action that the administrator
should follow, or require to be followed, on the basis
of facts properly found. But policy should play no
part in the decision of questions of fact; policy, rightly
understood, cannot call for the decision of a question
of fact in a particular way.
To illustrate: The State Liquor Authority may
properly take the policy of the statute into account in
specifying the kinds of action by a manufacturer or
wholesaler that constitute a gift or service to a retail
licensee tending to influence such licensee to purchase
the product of the manufacturer or wholesaler, in
violation of Section 101 of the Alcoholic Beverage

87
88

Id.
See infra Part X.
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Control Law. But policy has no proper place in a
determination of whether a particular manufacturer or
wholesaler has in fact been guilty of that kind of
action. Once a violation has been found to exist in
fact, policy may again come into play in determining
the penalty.
The distinction that I suggest has not always
been clear in the minds of administrative judges. It is
my hope that this report will make it so. If this
distinction is kept in mind in administrative
adjudication, much will have been done to meet
whatever problem now exists. The administrative
judge must still, however, understand that even when
policy plays a proper part it should be applied with the
fair-minded deliberation that characterizes responsible
adjudication . . . . 89
Retired Oregon Supreme Court Justice W. Michael Gillette
made this same point more succinctly, saying, “The facts are
whatever they are, and the legal consequences that flow from them
flow only from them after we decide what the facts are. The facts are
not what they are because the law is what it is; the facts are what they
are, period.” 90
One of the early reviewers of this article took issue with
Justice Gillette’s “facts are the facts” point. He wrote:
I think that’s far too simplistic—what ALJ’s decide
are not the actual facts, but their inference about what
the facts are based on particular evidence and
testimony provided in the proceeding. Presumptions
are important in addressing uncertainties about what
the facts actually are and involve policy consideration,
namely which side do we want to err on (knowing that

89

BENJAMIN, supra note 66, at 22–24.
W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, Judicial
Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 95, 115 (2000).
90
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uncertainty and error are an inevitable part of any fact
finding).
To this, my response is that the same comment could be made
about the entire common law adjudication system—all “facts” are the
fact finder’s interpretation of testimony, documents, and other
admissible evidence, whether the fact finder is a general jurisdiction
judge, jury, an ALJ, or an agency head. But how fair is it for one of
the litigants—instead of the neutral presiding officer in the case—to
determine what the facts of the case actually are? That is the point to
be decided. The ancient maxim “nemo iudex in causa sua,”
translated as “no person should be a judge in their own cause,” is
applicable here and supports the transfer of final decision authority
on fact-findings to the neutral central panel ALJ.
VII.

AGENCY HEAD AUTHORITY TO OVERRULE ALJ FACT
FINDINGS—WHERE DID THIS AUTHORITY ORIGINATE AND WHAT
ARGUMENTS SUPPORT IT?
In extensive reading on the final decision by central panel
ALJs issue, I have yet to find any attempt to logically justify the
conclusion that the head of an agency involved in the adjudication
should be able to overrule ALJ fact-findings. The agency head, as
one of the litigants, has a built-in conflict of interest and has not had
the ALJ’s opportunity to observe and question the witnesses to
clarify their testimony. 91

91

See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(examining “the incongruity of allowing an agency official who has seen only the
paper record to substitute his judgment for that of an adjudicatory officer ‘with
independent status, who saw the witnesses’ demeanor and gauged their
truthfulness.’”) (citing Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
Michael Asimow has commented on related issues. Under the then existing
California APA,
An agency that is dissatisfied with a proposed decision simply
rejects it and makes its own determinations of fact, law, and
policy from the cold record. Since agency heads are frequently
part-time appointees who have little time to give to their agency
responsibilities, the actual determination of rejection (and the
preparation of a new opinion) is done by agency staff. This
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The primary support for the conclusion that the head of an
agency involved in the adjudication should be able to overrule ALJ
fact-findings seems to be “that is the way we have always done it.”
At the federal level, the federal APA gives agency heads the
authority to overrule ALJ fact-findings. 92 At both the federal and
state levels, the agency heads have likewise always had this authority
when the ALJ was an in-house agency employee. All too often, this
is treated as the end of the discussion about whether or not such
practice makes much sense in states which have adopted the central
panel model.

cavalier treatment of proposed decisions sharply detracts from
the vitally important function of administrative judges as a check
on the possible institutional bias of the agency heads or staff.
....
. . . [P]ersons who have engaged in a hearing before a judge
resent a substitution of credibility findings by agency heads who
never heard the witnesses testify. Such persons tend to be more
trusting of administrative judges who are relatively independent
and insulated from contact with adversary staff members.
Moreover, efficiency is served by giving greater finality to the
judge’s findings rather than encouraging agency heads to reject
the judge’s findings and substitute their own. Finally, I believe
that a judge who has lived with a case, often for days or weeks,
and heard and saw all of the witnesses, is more likely to reach
accurate credibility findings than are persons whose only contact
with the case is a relatively brief exposure to a written transcript.
See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act:
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1115 (1992) (footnote
omitted); see also FRANK E. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE
COURTS 155 (William S. Hein & Co. 1951), which comments in part as follows,
with regard to what Mr. Cooper sees as a “problem inherent in the very nature of
administrative tribunals”:
Charged as they are with responsibility for the advancement of a
particular public policy, their desire to enforce that policy renders
it difficult for them to appraise with impassive objectivity the
evidence adduced at the hearing. Their special experience and
conviction may lead them to find claims clearly established on a
record which would leave a disinterested judge in doubt.
92

See Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
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States that have adopted the central panel model have a
choice. They can grant authority over the final fact-finding to the
head of the litigating agency or to the independent central panel
ALJ. 93 This option did not exist under the traditional adjudication
model in which the ALJ was an agency employee. 94 Professor
Flanagan explains the choice available with the creation of central
panels, writing, in part:
Before central panels, administrative adjudication was
clearly the sole province of the agency. The contested
case took place at the agency and fact-finding by the
ALJ was a preliminary step to the agency’s rendering
the final decision. Neither the process nor an APA
accorded the findings of the ALJ special status, and
proposed decisions by ALJs were clearly subject to
review and amendment by the agency. With central
panels, adjudication becomes a two-step process with
fact-finding now taking place before a trained
adjudicator outside the agency who renders a
preliminary decision. Agency review follows as a
separate and distinctive step in which the case returns
to the agency for another decision. From the
participant’s point of view, an agency that does not
adopt the ALJ’s decision favoring the litigant is
biased, and if the agency affirms the ALJ’s decision,
its decision is irrelevant, and the [agency head review]
process [is] time consuming, and expensive. The
creation of the central panel has transferred the focus
of adjudication from the final agency decision to the
fact-finding by the ALJ, and enhanced the latter’s
importance and status. 95

93

See, e.g., Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3.
See id. at 422–23.
95
Id.
94
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VIII. STATES NOT REQUIRED TO FOLLOW THE FEDERAL APA AND
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL APA
IN THE UNIVERSAL CAMERA DECISION
In drafting their individual APAs, the states are free to follow
the “laboratories of democracy” theory. 96 They are not bound by the
federal APA except insofar as they choose to adopt its provisions or,
perhaps, insofar as some provisions in the federal APA may be
constitutionally required by due process concerns. 97 In fact, most
states have patterned their APAs on one or more of the MSAPAs
rather than on the federal APA. 98
Under the federal APA, the agency head (or his or her
designated review panel or official exercising authority delegated by
the agency head) may overrule both ALJ findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 99 This is as required by the language of the
federal APA (5 U.S.C § 557(b)) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NRLB. 100 Section 557(b)
states in pertinent part that, “On appeal from or review of the initial

96

Justice Louis Brandeis popularized the laboratories of democracy
metaphor. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
The metaphor means that, except as limited by the U.S. Constitution or a state’s
own constitution, a state or local government may enact such legislation as its
legislative body considers appropriate and act as experimental labs for legislation
that other states and the federal government might later wish to emulate. The
theory has been quoted with approval in many Supreme Court cases over the years
since Justice Brandeis first introduced it. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160,
171 (2009); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980).
97
For a discussion of due process issues affecting administrative cases,
and the differences between the federal APA and state approaches in this regard,
see Arthur Earl Bonfield, supra note 33, at 323 n.107.
98
See id. at 297.
99
See Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir. 1986)
(“Under administrative law principles, an agency or board is free either to adopt or
reject an ALJ’s findings and conclusions of law.”); see also Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
100
5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NRLB, 340 U.S. 474,
494 (1951).
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decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in
making the initial decision . . . .” 101
In Universal Camera, the Supreme Court held that the quoted
statutory language allows an agency head subject to the federal APA
to overrule ALJ fact-findings even if the ALJ’s findings are based on
credibility of the witnesses which the agency head has not had the
opportunity to observe. 102
This rule in Universal Camera is the opposite of the rule
normally applied when appellate courts review fact-findings of lower
courts. Normally, the appellate court defers to the lower court’s factfindings since the appellate court did not have the lower court’s
opportunity to observe witness demeanor. 103

101

5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 495–96.
103
The Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure of the Second Hoover
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1953)
recommended that, in review of ALJ decisions, the federal agencies be limited to
the same type of fact review that the appellate courts exercise over lower court factfindings, but its recommendations were not adopted. See JOANNA L. GRISINGER,
THE UNWIELDY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE
NEW DEAL 216 (2012) (“The decisions of hearing commissioners were . . . to have
as much authority as the decisions of trial courts when reviewed by federal
appellate courts. Hearing commissioners’ findings of fact would be final unless the
agency on review determined that the findings were clearly erroneous.”). If this
recommendation of the Task Force had been enacted, federal law with regard to
agency authority over fact-findings would have been the same as advocates of final
fact-finding for central panel ALJs claim it should be in the central panel
jurisdictions. In accord with the Task Force, Bernard Schwartz, author of a popular
treatise on administrative law, wrote:
102

[Federal agency review of ALJ fact findings] should be eliminated
by a statute limiting the agency on appeals from ALJ decisions to
appellate power. Congress could accomplish this by removing
from . . . the APA the provision: “On appeal from or review of the
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have
in making the initial decision.” In its place, there should be a
provision that, on review of an ALJ initial decision, the agency
shall have only the powers of review that a court has upon judicial
review
of
the
agency’s
decisions.
Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TULSA L.J. 203, 218 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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Under Universal Camera, the agency head or agency review
authority must explain why it is overruling ALJ fact-findings. 104
Furthermore, the ALJ’s fact-findings to the contrary of those made
by the agency remain part of the record on review. 105 Stated another
way, reviewing courts weigh the ALJ’s findings against the agency’s
findings to determine what weight to give the agency fact-findings
and whether the agency head findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 106 But under the federal APA and the Universal Camera
decision, the agency head (or agency review authority) fact-findings,
not the fact-findings of the ALJ, are considered presumptively correct
by the appellate reviewing court. 107
The Universal Camera decision is not based on an
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. It is based instead on an
interpretation of the language of the federal APA. 108 Therefore, it is
not binding on the states unless they independently choose to adopt
it. The federal APA does not govern central panel adjudications.
Each state and local central panel jurisdiction is instead governed by
a separate statute or ordinance, which does not necessarily follow the
federal APA on the issue of agency head authority to overrule ALJ
fact-findings.
IX.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATING FINAL DECISION
AUTHORITY TO CENTRAL PANEL ALJS

It is black letter law that an administrative agency is a
creature of statute (or sometimes of a constitutional provision). 109 An
administrative agency has no inherent authority other than what the
drafters of the statute or the framers of the constitution have given

104

See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 494.
See id. at 493.
106
See id. at 496.
107
One of the early reviewers of this article argues that Universal Camera
in effect requires federal agency heads to defer to all ALJ fact-findings based on
credibility determinations. A number of lower federal courts initially thought that,
but the Supreme Court itself has rejected that interpretation of its Universal
Camera decision. See FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955).
108
See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487–96.
109
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 12 (2004).
105
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it. 110 It may exercise only those powers expressly granted by
statutory or constitutional provision together with those powers
necessarily implied by the powers it is expressly granted. 111 An
agency may not improvise upon its express powers so as to confer
authority on itself indirectly that it has not been granted either
expressly or by necessary implication. 112
In those states which have adopted central panel ALJ final
decision authority, the legislatures have made the decision to change
the regulatory scheme from the traditional one in which the agency
makes the final decision and the ALJ only makes a recommendation.
By definition, to the extent that a state legislature has transferred final
decision authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ, it has
created an exception to the agency’s traditional authority. Unless
there is some provision in the state or federal constitution prohibiting
the legislature from doing what it enacts legislation to accomplish,
the legislation will stand as part of state law. Unlike Congress, which
has authority to exercise only delegated powers expressly granted
under the U.S. Constitution or arising by necessary implication from
the powers expressly granted, state legislatures have plenary
legislative power to enact all legislation except as their plenary power
has been limited either expressly or by necessary implication by the
state or federal constitutions. 113
110

Id. § 107.
See id.
112
See id. § 109.
113
See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 15–16
(1998); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
OF THE AMERICAN UNION 173–74 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1999) (1868)
[hereinafter COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS] (“Congress can pass no
laws but such as the Constitution authorizes either expressly or by clear
implication; while the State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its
legislation is not prohibited.”). COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS is the
classic comparative work on state constitutions. Originally published in 1868, it
went through seven updated editions by 1903. After being out-of-print for many
years, this book was reprinted by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., in 1999 and again
in 2011. It compares the many state constitutions with one another and with the
federal Constitution. Some of it is now out-of-date due to developments since
Cooley originally wrote the book, but its basic premises are still applicable to
modern day comparative analysis of state constitutions. Its author, Thomas M.
Cooley, was the first dean of the University of Michigan Law School, a Chief
111
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Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, a Louisiana case, is
the most widely cited case discussing the constitutionality of ALJ
final decision authority. 114

Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, the first head of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and a president of the ABA. William J. Fleener, Jr., Michigan
Lawyers in History—Thomas McIntyre Cooley: Michigan’s Most Influential
B.
MICH.,
Lawyer,
ST.
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articleID=53&volumeID=3
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2013). There is an accredited law school named in his honor based
at Lansing, Michigan, with other campuses at Ann Arbor, Michigan; Auburn Hills,
Michigan; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Tampa Bay, Florida. See Accreditation,
THOMAS M. COOLEY L. SCH., http://www.cooley.edu/about/accreditation.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
114
There are two earlier, less publicized state court decisions upholding
the constitutionality of final decision authority for state central panel ALJs under
constitutions of their states. See Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal, supra note 3, at
10. Rossi writes in part, “At least one state, Florida, has held that final authority by
an ALJ located in a central panel does not violate state separation of powers
doctrine.” Id. Rossi identifies Florida Department of State v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d
290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), as that case. Id. at 11. Rossi’s comment that the
court was not presented with and hence did not consider some of the strongest
arguments against constitutionality is immaterial. The court decided the issue
notwithstanding that Rossi believes he has stronger arguments than the one the
court actually ruled on. The court decision will stand as the law of the state of
Florida unless it is overruled in a later case. See also MARY SHUPING, N.C. GEN.
ASSEM. RESEARCH DIV., CONTESTED CASES UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE APA:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OAH
FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 11–50 (2000). As part of the material she
assembled in this document, Ms. Shuping includes a legal opinion by North
Carolina General Assembly Staff Attorney Karen Cochrane Brown. Id. at 14. Ms.
Brown’s opinion, The Constitutionality of House Bill 968, reads in part, “[T]he
precise question . . . [concerning the constitutionality of delegating final decision
authority to a central panel ALJ without agency review subject to an appeal to the
courts] has been definitively answered by the [North Carolina] Court of Appeals.”
Id. at 16. Ms. Brown cites Employment Security Commission of North Carolina v.
Peace, 493 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), as the court of appeals case that
decided the issue. The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed this constitutional
issue as a discretionary appeal issue on which the North Carolina Supreme Court
had improvidently granted the appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court did not
hold that the North Carolina Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to rule on
the constitutional issue. Further, the court of appeals ruled on the issue in its
opinion in Employment Security Commission, 493 S.E.2d at 470–71. When a
higher court dismisses an appeal on non-substantive grounds, the decision of the
lower court (here the court of appeals) stands. I agree with Professor Rossi and
Ms. Brown’s reading of these two cases as deciding the final decision authority
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The Louisiana Supreme Court was relatively straightforward
in its treatment of constitutional issues in Wooley. 115 Wooley holds
that: (1) no specific powers or authority are granted to or conferred
on the Insurance Commissioner by the Louisiana constitution; and,
therefore, (2) the Louisiana legislature could freely transfer final
decision authority in an agency adjudication from one executive
branch agency (the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner) to another
executive branch agency (the Louisiana Central Panel). 116
Wooley strongly suggests that the legislation would have been
unconstitutional if: (3) the Louisiana constitution had conferred
specific authority on the Insurance Commissioner (which it did not);
and (4) the Louisiana legislature had enacted legislation purporting to
transfer a portion of the authority conferred on the Insurance
Commissioner by the Louisiana constitution to the central panel ALJ
(which the Wooley court determined that the legislature did not
do). 117
In Wooley, the Louisiana Supreme Court was not suggesting a
statute transferring final decision authority away from a line agency
to a central panel ALJ would violate the constitutionally required
separation of powers except as indicated in paragraphs (3) and (4)
above.
There are several law review articles which speculate about
the possibility that a state court might find that transferring final
decision authority from a line agency to a central panel ALJ would be
unconstitutional as an intrusion on “core executive branch functions”
of the executive. 118 However, none of these articles clearly
articulates the reasoning behind this speculation.

constitutional issue in the states of Florida and North Carolina unless and until the
cases are overturned.
115
See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d. 746, 761–
72 (La. 2005).
116
See id. at 767–68.
117
See id.
118
See Jay S. Bybee, supra note 32, at 462–63; Flanagan, Redefining the
Role, supra note 3, at 1410–11; Rossi, Final Orders On Appeal, supra note 3, at 2
(“Although there are many benefits to ALJ finality . . . it also risks undermining
core executive branch functions and thwarting accountability norms.”); Moliterno,
supra note 3, at 1227 n.181.
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Professors James F. Flanagan and Jim Rossi have been two of
the leading proponents of retaining final decision authority in the
agency instead of allowing all or part of it to be exercised by central
panel ALJs. As stated earlier, the late John Hardwicke was the first
chief ALJ and director of the Maryland OAH. 119 He was also the
first executive director of NAALJ and was a leading proponent of
central panel authority. In a debate between Judge Hardwicke and
Professors Flanagan and Rossi at the 2004 annual meeting of the
ABA in Atlanta, Georgia on the final decision issue (in which
Professors Flanagan and Rossi were presumably marshaling their
strongest arguments) neither Professor Rossi nor Professor Flanagan
brought up the issue of the possible unconstitutionality of ALJ final
decision authority. 120 In his article, Final, but Often Fallible:
Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, Professor Rossi alludes to
the constitutional argument, but then concedes that legislation
transferring final decision authority to central panel ALJs could be
drafted to avoid any constitutional problem. 121
Key to the constitutional arguments is the notion of separate
branches of government. Although invasion of the core functions of
the three branches of government is at least a theoretical problem in
state administrative law, the doctrine has not been well developed in
interpretation of state constitutions. 122 It has been developed most
coherently at the federal level. 123
One of the better articles to discuss the required separation of
core functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in
federal administrative agencies is Presidential Administration by
119

See supra note *.
See Jim Flanagan, Jim Rossi, John Hardwicke, & Tyrone T. Butler,
NCALJ Panel Discussion: ALJ Decisions—Final or Fallible?, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 191 (2005). This debate took place in the Georgia Office of
State Administrative Hearings during the 2004 ABA meeting in Atlanta, Georgia.
See id. at 191.
121
Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3, at 64.
122
For articles on the doctrine under state law, see Johnny C. Burris, The
Administrative Process and Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers, 75
FLA. B. J. 28 (2012); David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California
Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655 (2011); and
Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1337 (1990).
123
See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
120
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Associate Justice Elena Kagan of the U.S. Supreme Court. 124 Justice
Kagan wrote the article as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School
following her service under President Bill Clinton as Associate
General Counsel, then as a Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy,
and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council. 125 Although
she sees a definite role for the President in the supervision and
direction of federal agencies in rulemaking, she does not view the
President’s core authority as including any right to intervene in
administrative adjudication. 126 Justice Kagan explained:
[My] analysis with respect to adjudications, however,
is fundamentally different [from her analysis of
presidential authority to direct agency rulemaking],
reflecting the different nature of these administrative
proceedings and the different purposes of participation
in them. The famous, now always paired cases of
Londoner v. Denver and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization drew the constitutional
line of division, requiring notice and a hearing as a
matter of due process when an administrative
authority resolves disputes involving particular and
identifiable parties, but not when it adopts rules of
general application.
The APA maintained the
distinction, imposing much stricter procedural
requirements on agencies when they act through
adjudicative than through rulemaking processes. . . .
[T]he greater impetus behind the distinction comes
from a sense that the participation of an affected party
serves special values in adjudicative proceedings . . .
[I]n these proceedings, which apply to and affect
discrete individuals and firms, participation not only
provides needed information to the decision maker,
but also ensures fundamental fairness and protection
124

See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245 (2001).
125
See id. at 2246 n.*; see also Biography of Current Justices of the
COURT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,
Supreme
Court,
SUPREME
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
126
See Kagan, supra note 124, at 2306, 2362–63.
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against abuse, and thereby promotes the acceptability
of decisions.
In this context, presidential participation in
administration, of whatever form, would contravene
procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence
into the resolution of controversies. . . . [As] the
Supreme Court stated in Myers v. United States:
“there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character
imposed on executive officers and members of
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing
affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which
the President can not in a particular case properly
influence or control.” . . . The consequence here is to
disallow the President from disrupting or displacing
the procedural, participatory requirements associated
with agency adjudication . . . . 127
A recent law review article by Professor Jamelle C. Sharp
says that, similarly, Congress is strictly prohibited from interfering
with individual cases undergoing agency adjudication. 128
The same points made by Justice Kagan and Professor Sharpe
are also made by Charles H. Koch:
[P]olitical actors have a role in the
administrative process. To a large extent the role is
legitimate and positive. However, there are some
limits on the amount and kind of influence which will
be permissible. In agency adjudications of individual
cases or controversies where the agency is performing
its “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” role, influence from
the legislative or executive branch is considered

127

Id. at 2362–63 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
128
Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 183, 198 (2013).
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improper because it threatens procedural rights of the
individual litigants. 129
Quasi-judicial administrative adjudications are thus not
subject to control by either the executive or legislative branches of
government. 130
A student article by Asher P. Spiller expresses the view that
final decision authority for the North Carolina central panel violates
the state constitution. 131 Its analysis conflicts with the one presented
here. Spiller argues that the legislature, after making an agency
responsible for regulation of a particular subject, could not
constitutionally limit the agency’s authority to adjudicate regulatory
issues. 132 I did not find the argument convincing.
My own experience in Texas is relevant here. During the
early part of my career, I served for eight years on the Texas
Attorney General’s staff as an Assistant Attorney General where,
among other duties, I sometimes wrote memos or attorney general
opinions on the constitutionality of actual or proposed state
legislation. I followed this employment with five years as an
Assistant General Counsel to the Governor (where I continued to
review the constitutionality of legislation to avoid constitutional
problems or for possible exercise of the Governor’s veto authority). I
then spent approximately three years as General Counsel to the Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts (where I still worked with state
constitutional issues) and a year as chief legal advisor to the Texas
Public Utility Commission. In these positions, I acquired a good
basic understanding of the Texas Constitution and of how the Texas
Governor relates to Texas state agencies and vice versa.

129

CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 400
(3d ed. 2010).
130
See id. On this same point and in agreement with the authorities cited
above, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622–23 (1984); Paul R.
Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 982 (1980).
131
Asher P. Spiller, The Folly in Finality: The Constitutionality of ALJ
Final Decision-Making Authority in North Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2162 (2012).
132
See id. at 2182.
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The Governor of Texas is chief executive of the State of
Texas, but since Texas has a plural executive branch (including
several statewide separately elected executive branch officials such
as the Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller
Of Public Accounts, the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
the Commissioner of Agriculture, and three individually elected
members of the Railroad Commission),134 the Texas Governor cannot
in fact or in theory claim the power over administrative agencies that
is sometimes claimed for the President of the United States under the
so-called unitary executive theory. 135 Quite clearly, Texas, with so
many separately elected executive officials, has a plural, rather than a
unitary, executive. 136 I cannot imagine a Texas court holding that a
statute was unconstitutional because it deprived a Texas governor of
quasi-judicial authority by transferring final adjudicative decision
authority to a central panel ALJ. I cannot imagine a Texas governor
even raising that contention. If it were raised, I am confident the
Texas courts would hold that quasi-judicial authority is not part of
the Texas governor’s “core functions.” While the regulatory
agencies are located in the executive branch of state government, the
adjudicatory functions of the agencies operate independently of both
the governor and the legislature.
133

133

See TEXAS POLITICS: THE GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_2_0.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
134
See TEXAS POLITICS: THE PLURAL EXECUTIVE, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_0.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS
POLITICS:
ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
U.
TEX.
AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_3.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS
POLITICS: COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_4.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS
POLITICS: COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_5.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS
POLITICS:
COMMISSIONER
OF
AGRICULTURE,
U.
TEX.
AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_6.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS
POLITICS:
RAILROAD
COMMISSION,
U.
TEX.
AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_8.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); see also
TEX. CONST. art. IV.
135
See TEXAS POLITICS: THE PLURAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 134
(describing the limitations of the plural executive).
136
See F. Scott McCown, Executive Orders and the Powers of the Texas
Governor, Discussion at the 2nd Annual Advanced Texas Administrative Law
Seminar (Aug. 30, 2007).
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While one has to be careful in assuming that all fifty state
constitutions are alike in most of their provisions, the separation of
powers into three separate coordinate branches of government is
basic to the federal and to all state constitutions. 137 Until shown the
contrary, the reader should assume that all fifty states would prohibit
their governors from directly exercising executive authority to
control the outcome of individual adjudications. Thus, there would
be nothing that a governor could properly complain had been taken
away from the powers of his or her office if final decision-making in
the adjudicative functions of administrative agencies were transferred
from the line agencies to central panel ALJs. The transfer could not
take place, of course, should it infringe on any constitutional
authority expressly granted to individual agencies.
Again, to draw an analogy with federal agency adjudications,
on numerous occasions Congress has placed final decision authority
in a separate adjudicatory agency ALJ or in a court, instead of in the
administrative agency having primary jurisdiction to regulate the
subject matter involved in the adjudication. 138 For a comprehensive
discussion of the situations in which this has occurred, see Daniel J.
Gifford’s article, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of
an Alternative Agency Structure. 139

137

See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III; see also DANIEL L. GRANT & H.C.
NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 144 (3d ed. 1975) (“Every
state constitution provides for a framework of government. In general or specific
terms, it outlines three branches of government: legislative, executive, and
judicial.”).
138
See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role
of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1990–1991).
139
See id. Gifford gives as examples, the Board of Tax Appeals, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Federal Mine Safety
and Heath Review Commission. Id. at 982, 974–75, 1000–03, 1001. See also the
Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945, which departs from the usual
APA pattern without transferring the ALJ position to a separate agency. In
Zimmerman v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 871
F.2d 564, 566–67 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), the court commented on this
as follows:
We note in passing that our reviewing function is quite
different under the Black Lung Benefits Act than it is under the
Social Security Act. . . . The statutory scheme under the Black
Lung Benefits Act is quite different, for here Congress has
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Professor Gifford writes that in certain federal agencies
(generally described as “mass-justice agenc[ies]”)—those with
voluminous caseloads in which decisions are based primarily on
factual rather than legal or policy determinations—it is physically
impossible for the agency head to make the final decision in
individual cases. 140 In those agencies, the agency head instead sets
policy for the cases through rulemaking. 141 This leaves the final
decision to the ALJ, who decides the facts without agency review.142
The agency is only a litigant without any role in controlling the result
in individual cases. 143 Professor Gifford says this structure has
existed in some federal agencies for many years—primarily in
benefit-granting agencies, but also in some regulatory agencies. 144
These non-traditional arrangements are sometimes referred to as
“split-enforcement model adjudication.” 145
Academicians have sometimes criticized the way these nontraditional arrangements are structured, 146 but I have not located any

expressly placed the power to make conclusive findings of fact
with the ALJ, and limited the Board’s function to determining
whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Under this scheme we are to defer to the ALJ, not to the Board.
140

See Gifford, supra note 138, at 997–98.
See id. at 998.
142
See id.
143
See id.
144
Id. at 988–92, 997.
145
See id. at 1000 n.104 (citing George Robert Johnson, Jr., The SplitEnforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences,
39 ADMIN L. REV. 315 (1987)); see also George Robert Johnson, Jr., Background
Report for Recommendation 86-4—The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, in ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 293
(1986).
146
See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 19 (1986). This recommendation reads in part:
141

An Administrative Conference study of the experience with the
“split-enforcement model” . . . was unable to conclude whether
this model achieves greater fairness in adjudication than does the
traditional structural model. Fairness is an important but an
unquantifiable and subjective value. Therefore, the Conference
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arguments in law journals or elsewhere that the above arrangements
are unconstitutional either as an infringement on the core powers of
the President or Congress or that they are unconstitutional for other
reasons.
If the federal government can withhold final decision
authority from federal agencies and place it either in separate
administrative adjudicatory agencies or in ALJs, without raising valid
constitutional concerns about infringement on the core authority of
either the President or Congress (as it has done on numerous
occasions), it is more than reasonable to assume that the states can do
likewise.
X.
ARTICLES ADVOCATING THAT CENTRAL PANEL ALJS MAKE
ONLY A RECOMMENDED DECISION, WITH THE AGENCY HEAD MAKING
THE FINAL DECISION ON BOTH FACTS AND LAW
The most widely cited articles touching on the topic of final
decision authority for central panel ALJs are James F. Flanagan,
Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central
Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of
Agency Review 147 (cited 43 times); James E. Moliterno, The
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth 148 (cited 29 times);
and Jim Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with

takes no position on whether the split-enforcement model is
preferable to a structure in which responsibilities for rulemaking,
enforcement and adjudication are combined within a single
agency. Our study did reveal, however, that because Congress
[in setting up the split-enforcement model], did not specify
clearly the . . . responsibilities of [the different agencies
involved] in resolving questions of law and policy, unnecessary
conflicts have arisen between the agencies and there has been
confusion expressed by reviewing courts over which agency’s
views were entitled to the greater deference.
Id.
147

Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3. Professor Flanagan wrote
a second article opposing central panel ALJ final decision authority entitled, An
Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority. See
Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3 (cited 15 times).
148
Moliterno, supra note 3.
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ALJ Finality 149 (cited 16 times). I will begin my discussion of these
articles with a discussion of Professor Moliterno’s article. 150
A.

Moliterno’s Article, The Administrative Judiciary’s
Independence Myth

For purposes of this paper, I am defining “decisional
independence” as, “the ability of an ALJ to reach a final decision in
each case based solely on the evidence of record, the matters of
which official notice may properly be taken, and the applicable law
without undue pressure or interference from the agency or any
outside parties.” As indicated below, the case law and the academic
and professional commentaries support the independence of ALJs
using this definition. 151 This is not the definition of ALJ
independence that Professor Moliterno uses. His definition revolves
around final decision authority only. Professor Moliterno asserts that
ALJs lack independence because the agency, in most jurisdictions,
may overrule the ALJ’s recommended decision and reach other
conclusions both on factual and legal issues. 152
The article ALJ Independence and Final Order Authority, by
David Marcus, contains an excellent response to this assertion. 153
ALJ Marcus writes, in part:
[T]hese issues are not concerns for ALJ independence;
rather, they are concerns about fairness and the
appearance of fairness in the agency’s final order
decision process.

149

Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3. Professor Rossi wrote
an earlier version of Final, but Often Fallible. It is entitled, ALJ Final Orders On
Appeal: Balancing Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 1 (1999) (cited 12 times).
150
See infra Part X.A.
151
See infra notes 153–167 and accompanying text.
152
See Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1224–25.
153
See David Marcus, ALJ Independence and the Issue of Final Order
Authority, ADMIN. L. NEWSL. (Or. State Bar, Admin. Law Section, Tigard, Or.),
Winter
2009,
at
1,
2,
available
at
http://osbadmin.homestead.com/files/newsletters/AdminNL_Winter_09.pdf.
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As an ALJ who has conducted contested case
hearings involving a variety of agencies, I have held
numerous cases in which I was authorized to issue a
final order, and numerous other cases in which I was
authorized only to issue a proposed order, with the
agency involved reserving its authority to issue the
final order. In my view, the independence of an ALJ
is not affected by the decisional authority delegated to
the ALJ in the case.
The “independence” of the ALJ is related to
the conduct of the hearing—to develop a full record—
and to the preparation of the ALJ’s order based solely
on that record. 154
Based on my own twenty years of experience as an ALJ and
hearing officer in Texas, I think ALJ David Marcus is absolutely
correct. In over twenty years as an ALJ, I had both cases in which I
had final decision authority and cases in which I had authority only to
make a recommended decision. Whether I had final decision
authority or authority only to make a recommended decision made
little difference in how I handled the case, except that I probably
spent a little less time on a recommended decision than a final one,
since the hearing rules under which I practiced required anyone
appealing my decision to the agency head to file exceptions with me
before the exceptions went to the agency head. This gave me a
chance to amend the recommended decision if, on reading the
exceptions, I considered some of them to be well taken or to expose
ambiguities in my explanation of the decision that needed correction.
Professor Moliterno begins his article by stating that
administrative law is not his field, but is a field to which he has only
recently been introduced by Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr. 155
Professor Moliterno’s article adopts a position against central panel
ALJ final decision authority. 156 His arguments rest primarily on the

154

Id.
See Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1191 n.*.
156
See id. at 1230–31.
155

518

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

Flanagan and Rossi law review articles, 157 but Professor Moliterno
builds his position through a series of arguments, which are flawed
and demonstrably incorrect.
The most critical flaw is the most basic: Professor
Moliterno’s main thesis as stated in his title is that ALJs lack—and
are intended to lack—independence from the agencies they work
for. 158 If this were true, the administrative adjudication process
would be a sham with pre-ordained results. Fortunately, the weight
of authority is overwhelmingly against Professor Moliterno’s
conclusion that ALJs lack independence. 159
In Butz v. Economou, 160 a 5–4 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Associate Justice Byron R. White addressed the ALJ
independence issue and held that federal ALJs clearly have
decisional independence free from improper influence by their host
agencies. 161 Justice White stated this view, in which he was joined
by a majority of the court, as follows:
[T]he process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner
exercises his independent judgment on the evidence
before him, free from pressures by the parties or other
officials within the agency. . . . [T]he Administrative
Procedure Act contains a number of provisions
designed to guarantee the independence of hearing
examiners. They may not perform duties inconsistent
with their duties as hearing examiners. When
conducting a hearing under § 5 of the APA, a hearing
examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the
supervision or direction of, employees or agents
engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecution functions for the agency. Nor may a

157

See id. at 1191 n.2, 1225 n.173, 1226 n.179, 1226–27, 1227 n.181,
1227 n.182, 1228 n.189, 1229 n.198, 1229–30, 1230 n.200, 1230 nn.202–03, 1231
n.206, 1233 n.212.
158
See id. at 1191, 1192.
159
See infra notes 160–167 and accompanying text.
160
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
161
See id. at 513–14.
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hearing examiner consult any person or party,
including other agency officials, concerning a fact at
issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate. Hearing examiners must
be assigned to cases in rotation so far as is
practicable. They may be removed only for good
cause established and determined by the Civil Service
Commission . . . . 162
Also disagreeing with Professor Moliterno, in an exhaustive
study of the federal ALJ position for the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS), some of our leading administrative law
academics, Professors Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, and Professor Moliterno’s mentor,
Charles H. Koch, Jr., wrote: “In short, ALJs are very nearly as
independent of federal agencies as federal trial judges are of the
executive branch. This high degree of independence of ALJs from
agencies is designed to protect the rights of individuals affected by
agency adjudicatory decisions from any potential source of bias.” 163
Also at odds with Professor Moliterno’s conclusion that ALJs
lack independence is the ABA Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice’s A Guide to Federal Agency Adjudication,
which states in part: “Improper interference with ALJ performance
includes interference with the writing of opinions or interference with
the way in which an ALJ conducts hearings. Courts have held that
the decisional independence of the administrative judiciary is
constitutionally protected.” 164
162

Id. (citations omitted).
Verkuil, Gifford, Koch, Pierce, & Lubbers, supra note 39, at 982; see
also KOCH, supra note 129, at 62 (“Presiding officials who are designated ALJs
have a special status established and protection by the APA. Although ALJs do not
have the status of Article III judges, their independence is firmly established and
accepted.”).
164
AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY
PRACTICE, A GUIDE to FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 176–77 (Michael
Asimow ed., 2003) (footnotes omitted) (citing Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597,
603–08 (6th Cir. 2000); Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark.
1999)); see also Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J.
NAT'L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 321 (2002).
Such well-thought-of
administrative adjudicators as Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Senior ALJ of the Colorado
163
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Professor Moliterno has simply redefined the term
“independence” to place ALJs outside his definition and has ignored
the fact that the term has been used almost universally by the courts,
academics, and the organized bar to describe ALJs. His contention
that ALJs lack independence made a catchy title for his law review
article, but Professor Moliterno’s arguments in support of his thesis
clearly will not stand up to analysis.
Professor William S. Jordan, III has also drawn this
conclusion. 165 In his article, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An
Unintended Combination, Professor Jordan writes that,
James Moliterno insists that ALJs are impartial as a
result of the APA’s provisions but that they are not
independent . . . . In administrative law parlance,
however, they are generally considered to be
independent, particularly because their salaries and
positions are protected and because the APA requires
separation of the functions of investigation and
prosecution from the ALJ’s function of decision.
Moliterno is correct that the agency controls policy,
but the ALJ is both independent and impartial in
factual decisions. 166
Another flaw in Professor Moliterno’s arguments appears
where he writes:
Although administrative judges are not
required to follow precedent, they are required to
Office of Administrative Courts and Adjunct Professor at the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law, and AJ Ann Marshall Young of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission have also written on the decisional independence of ALJs. See Edwin
L. Felter, Jr., Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right and
Wrong Kind, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 19, 26 (2010); Ann Marshall
Young, Judicial Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and
Future, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 101, 117 (1999). The Felter and
Marshall Young articles cannot be reconciled with Professor Moliterno’s view that
administrative law judges lack independence.
165
See William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An
Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 251 n.7 (2009).
166
Id. (citation omitted).
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make their decisions impartially based on factors
outside of their own senses of proper agency policy.
Clearly, administrative judges must follow the
agency’s legislative rules, but, perhaps more
controversially with some administrative judges, they
must also follow other statements or indicators of
agency policy. 167
Professor Moliterno’s statement above about ALJs not
following precedent and not being required to follow statements or
indicators of agency policy other than properly promulgated rules is
incorrect.
1.

Moliterno’s statement that ALJs do not follow precedent

The treatise by Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law,
correctly summarizes the common practice of state and federal
agencies with regard to following their own precedents. 168 Cooper
writes:
[I]t can fairly be said that administrative agencies act
very much the same as do the courts, so far as
concerns their respect for precedents. An agency may
consider as settled a question recently decided by it,
for the very reason that a precedent exists. At the
same time, as do the courts, agencies distinguish and
in appropriate instances overrule their own precedents.
The colorful phrase of Judge Wyzanski, who
remarked “The administrator is expected to treat
experience not as a jailer but as a teacher,” can be
applied equally to the courts and to the state agencies.
This approach to precedent has evolved with the
increasing maturity of the agencies. It was long
assumed that there was but little room to apply the

167

Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1199 (footnote omitted) (citing Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693,
695–96 (2005)).
168
See FRANK E. COOPER, 2 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 530–31 (1965).
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doctrine of stare decisis to determinations of
administrative agencies; they were not expected to
apply fixed or unvarying rules or policies; but to
exercise discretion and ingenuity in working out a
satisfactory solution for each new case. Further, it
was generally conceived that since the announcement
of a decision by an agency did not establish a rule of
law but represented rather an ad hoc determination,
the foundations of the doctrine of stare decisis (which
were deeply rooted in the notion that the law was
unchanging) did not square with the theory of
administrative adjudication.
....
However, many agencies, motivated in part no
doubt by practical considerations and arguments of
convenience, have adopted the practice of relying
heavily on their decisions in former cases. As long
ago as 1941, the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure found that “in almost every
instance the agencies’ officers who were interviewed
expressed the belief that they accorded to the
precedents of their respective agencies as much
weight as is thought to be given by the highest court
of a state to its own prior decisions.” 169
2.
Moliterno’s assertion that ALJs are required to follow
statements or indicators of agency policy other than properly
promulgated rules
In his classic work, Manual For Administrative Law Judges,
retired ALJ Merritt Ruhlen has summarized the law on the
requirement that AJs follow an agency’s legislative rules and other
statements or indicators of agency policy, as follows:

169

Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Shawmut Ass’n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791,
796 (1st Cir. 1945); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 466 (Gov’t
Printing
Office
1941),
available
at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/1941appendixM.pdf
(last
visited July 22, 2013)).
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The cornerstone of the formal administrative
process is the principle that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge is an independent
intellectual judgment, based solely upon the
applicable laws (including agency regulations and
precedent) and the facts contained in the record. This
has several consequences.
The Judge should not consider public or
private statements of agency members or heads,
Congressmen, or congressional committees. The only
non-record pronouncements of government officials
relevant to his decision are official and operative
pronouncements: not policy statements by the agency
members but agency rules and decisions; not speeches
by administration officials but current Executive
Orders; not comments by Congressmen or
congressional committees but statutes of present
effect. It is not fair to expect the parties to answer
contentions not of record. Moreover, most such
contentions, however high the source, are made
without benefit of the factual information developed at
the hearing.
A few words are necessary concerning the
relationship which the decision should bear to the
established policies of the agency. It is the Judge’s
duty to decide all cases in accordance with agency
policy. Even when court decisions (other than those
of the Supreme Court) have found the agency’s
position to be erroneous, he is bound to apply the
agency view if the agency has authoritatively declared
its nonacquiesence in the decisions. However, if the
parties have introduced evidence or arguments, not
previously considered by the agency which tend to
show that established policy should be changed, the
Judge should consider such contentions and if he is
convinced he should so find.
This is not to suggest that the Judge should
seek to divine that result which the current
membership of the agency will approve.
His
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responsibility is to follow established agency policy.
To attempt to predict future votes would be an
abdication of his proper role. The whole purpose of
the Judge’s decision is to give the agency the benefit
of his judgment after a proceeding specifically
designed to elicit the truth of the matter; nothing
whatever is gained if he seeks to set before the agency
members instead only a mirror of their own thoughts,
no matter how obtained. For this reason the Judge’s
decision should not be swayed by any tentative
finding of fact or conclusion of law or policy
contained in an order of investigation, an order to
show cause, or any other action by which the agency
has indicated how it is thinking.
Agency staff’s view should be subjected to the
same impartial scrutiny as the views of any other
interested person. There is no room for a presumption
that the staff position is superior because it is put
forward as an objective, untainted furthering of the
“public interest”. It is the Judge’s job to decide where
the public interest lies, and the theory of the system
presumes that this is best achieved by impartial
evaluation of all facts and arguments on their
merits. 170
When he directly addresses the subject of the finality of an
ALJ decision, Professor Moliterno first cites the applicable section of
the federal APA for the proposition that the agency, not the ALJ, has
final decision authority. 171 Of course, the federal APA has no direct
bearing on whether a particular state central panel ALJ has final
decision authority. 172 A person must look instead to the state APA or
sometimes to the organic state statute governing the particular agency
170

MERRITT RUHLEN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 66–68 (1st ed. 1974).
171
Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1224 (citing federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2000)).
172
See supra Part VIII (discussing the fact that individual state APAs and
enabling acts (rather than the federal APA) govern state administrative
adjudication).
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to determine whether a central panel ALJ does or does not have final
decision authority in a particular case. 173 The federal APA applies
only to federal agencies. State agencies are subject to state APAs
and enabling acts for each agency—not to the federal APA. 174
Professor Moliterno next argues that, “Administrative judges .
. . exist in order to further the policies of the executive branch,
specifically the agency for which they judge, through the impartial
adjudication of disputes. Allowing administrative judges final
authority over policy and perhaps even over fact findings, however,
would thwart that end.” 175
Professor Moliterno’s statement that ALJs exist to further the
policies of the executive branch is a misstatement. The ALJ’s proper
role is as a neutral. It is to make certain both sides to the case receive
a fair hearing, not to further the mission or policies of an
administrative agency—except insofar as the agency proves those
policies have been properly promulgated—and to apply the properly
promulgated agency policies and the law to the facts in the case
before the ALJ. Stated another way, the ALJ’s intended role is not to
have either a pro or anti-agency bias, but to confront every case with
an open mind. The ALJ’s role is to fully and fairly analyze the facts
and legal arguments presented and to decide each case based on the
record, according to the rule of law, to the best of the ALJ’s ability.
The ALJ’s job, like the job of any other judge, is to “call balls and
strikes and not to pitch or to bat.” 176 Indeed, under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, this neutral role of the ALJ is
constitutionally required. 177
On the issue of ALJ finality, Professor Moliterno primarily
adopts the arguments of Professors Flanagan and Rossi. He writes:

173

See supra Part VIII.
Id.
175
Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1226.
176
John Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Opening Statement
to the Senate Judiciary Committee During Nomination Hearings (Sept. 12, 2005)
(stating
the
proper
role
of
a
judge),
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
177
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (finding that “an impartial decision maker is
essential.”).
174
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Flanagan argues that granting final authority [to ALJs]
“will significantly alter state contested case
adjudication by creating inconsistencies between the
agencies’ articulated policies and the results achieved
through contested case litigation and will adversely
affect the agency’s enforcement of its statutory
mandate.”
....
. . . Such authority is irreconcilable with their role as
an executive judiciary . . . . 178
In a footnote, Professor Moliterno quotes Professor Rossi,
writing: “‘ALJ finality . . . risks undermining core executive branch
functions and thwarting accountability norms.’ Indeed, Rossi even
questions the constitutionality of the idea. . . . ‘[T]he cases are
decidedly unhelpful in addressing whether delegation of final order
authority to an ALJ outside of a politically accountable agency is
constitutional.’” 179
Switching back to his main text, Professor Moliterno notes
that, “furthermore, there is reliable evidence that . . . [ALJ final
decision authority] will produce uncertainty in the law and a loss in
accountability, and will nullify agency experience in applying the law
and agency discretion in applying its own rules.” 180
In another footnote, Professor Moliterno adds:
Flanagan defends these views extensively and ably,
and his article has never received an adequate
response from anyone of an opposing outlook. His
final conclusion—that “the executive department has
lost some of its ability to enforce the law,” because of
ALJ finality—is another cogent and unanswered

178

Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1226–27 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1362).
179
Id. at 1227 n.181 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal, supra note 3, at 2, 10 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
180
Id. at 1227.
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argument in favor of continuing the present system of
agency review. 181
Recognizing that “an adequate response” is in the eye of the
beholder, as a person of an opposing outlook, I will respond to the
arguments of both Professor Flanagan and Professor Rossi in the next
two subsections of this paper. 182 However, before I respond, I must
take issue with Professor Moliterno’s assertion that their arguments
have gone unanswered or have not been adequately responded to
previously. John Hardwicke, retired Chief ALJ of the Maryland
OAH, debated Professors Flanagan and Rossi on the central panel
ALJ final decision issue in 2004. 183 Many who either heard the
debate or read the transcript thought that Judge Hardwicke clearly
won the debate. I will discuss some of his key points in more detail
below.
Further, there are several articles supporting final decision
authority for ALJs that predate the articles of Professors Flanagan
and Rossi to which neither have ever responded. These articles
include Richard M. Hluchan, Administrative Adjudication in New
Jersey: Why Not Let the ALJ Decide? 184 Mr. Hluchan argues
persuasively that allowing the agency to change the outcome of a
recommended neutral central panel ALJ decision is unfair to the
private litigant and unnecessarily runs up costs for both the state and
the private litigant. 185 He also argues that it unnecessarily delays the

181

Id. at 1227 n.182 (citation omitted) (quoting Flanagan, Redefining the
Role, supra note 3 at 1410).
182
See infra Part X.B–C.
183
See Flanagan, Rossi, Hardwicke & Butler, supra note 120.
184
Richard M. Hluchan, Administrative Adjudications in New Jersey: Why
Not Let the ALJ Decide?, N.J. LAW, Oct./Nov. 1996, at 28, reprinted in 33 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 560 (2013). This article is being reprinted at my
request as an example of law review articles supporting final decision authority for
central panel ALJs. Although these articles exist, they have appeared primarily in
journals of limited circulation and have been written as advocacy pieces in an
attempt to influence lawmakers in the jurisdictions in which the articles appear. To
my knowledge, none of them have previously been run in law journals with a
national circulation.
185
Id.; see also Testimony of Red Tape Review Group Hearing, Richard
M. Hluchan et al. (Mar. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Testimony to Red Tape Review
Group],
available
at
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time it would otherwise take to get to an appellate court for review. 186
Professor Flanagan cites the Hluchan article but does not discuss it in

http://www.nj.gov/governor/news/reports/pdf/20100302_rtg.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2013) (supporting ALJ final decision authority for the New Jersey Central
Panel before the New Jersey Governor’s Red Tape Review Group). Mr. Hluchan
testified, in part:
In addition to being a matter of fundamental fairness and
due process, the current system is really inefficient. It costs more
money than is necessary, it consumes more staff time than is
necessary, and it adds additional time, all of which is
unnecessary.
We have the commissioner essentially doing a
redundant review of the ALG’s [sic] decision. And, of course,
when we say the Commissioner, we know the commissioner does
not personally review every one of these and write a decision and
review the transcript, and so forth. It’s the staff that we’re
talking about that do that.
So if we eliminate this redundant review you free up
staff to do more important things. You don’t have the cost of the
redundant review and you don’t have, from the point of view of
both sides, the additional time that’s consumed.
Id. at 39–40.
186
Id; see also Testimony to Red Tape Review Group, supra note 185, at
91–92. Mr. Joseph Morano, former chair of the Administrative Law Section of the
State Bar of New Jersey, testified in favor of central panel ALJ final decision
authority. His hearing testimony transcript is as follows:
One of the things you also need to look at . . . [when] the
administrative law judge . . . issues an initial decision [and]
the agency reviews, there’s the period of exceptions where
one party may say I disagree with the ALJ’s decision for the
following reason . . . .
....
. . . [In many] of these cases we have [attorneys from] large
firms representing towns, school districts, counties, also
private entities . . . . Attorneys don’t do this for free. . . . [This
cost is in addition to the cost for whoever] at the agency . . . is
reviewing it. [T]hat’s a whole other level of cost . . . .
....
It’s more expensive, it’s time-intensive, and it takes a long
time. So that maybe makes parties on both sides think a little
bit about what they are going to do [before just automatically
appealing a decision they disagree with to the New Jersey
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any depth. 187 Instead, his only comment on the Hluchan article is
that, “Citizen frustration at the power of agencies to overturn the
ALJ’s decision after the ALJ and the parties have invested substantial
time and effort in presenting the case and obtained a favorable result
is understandable and extensive.” 188
Professors Flanagan and Rossi have also failed to respond to
Robert S. Lorch’s Administrative Court via the Independent Hearing
Officer, where Professor Lorch argues that state agency heads, many
of whom are without legal training, lack the legal expertise to
overrule central panel ALJ adjudicatory decisions; therefore, they
should not have final decision authority. 189 Professor Lorch also
wrote a book, Democratic Process and Administrative Law, in which
he makes essentially the same argument as he did in the previouslymentioned article:
So long as hearing-officer decisions are only
recommendations, administrative adjudication will
continue to display some terribly questionable
practices as a consequence. Many agency heads who
now have adjudicatory power are not lawyers: the
members of a state board of barber examiners, for
example. . . . The question whether an agency head is
or is not a lawyer is significant partly because in
administrative adjudication the rules of evidence are
relaxed and legal training is useful to handle and
assess the great junk yard of evidence that sometimes
piles up in an administrative hearing. 190

courts].
Id.
187

See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1386 n.136.
Id. at 1386 (citing Hluchan, supra note 185, at 28).
189
See Robert S. Lorch, Administrative Court via the Independent
Hearing Officer, 51 JUDICATURE 114, 118 (1967).
190
See ROBERT S. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS & ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 211 (1969); see also John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement:
Problems, Solution, and Ethical Considerations, 2 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 17 (2000)
(taking an opposite position to Professor Flanagan’s position on almost every issue
that Professor Flanagan discusses).
188
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The Flanagan Articles

In his original article on Central Panel ALJ Final Decision
Authority, Professor Flanagan states the following:
The core argument for agency review is that
the legislature delegated to the agency the
responsibility
for
enforcing
a
particular
comprehensive statutory scheme, including the
development and application of legislative policy
through regulations. Contested cases often raise
important policy questions that could not have been
anticipated, are not covered by the regulations, or are
created by the complexity of the case. Moreover, the
agency has institutional experience and expertise in
the application of the statute that makes it the
appropriate final decisionmaker. Agency review of
contested cases also provides greater consistency in
decisionmaking so that factually similar cases are
decided the same way, at least when they are decided
at or about the same time. In addition, agencies are
politically accountable for the results of their
regulation, but ALJs in independent central panels
adjudicating individual cases, are accountable only for
the decision in each case heard. ALJs are not
accountable for insuring that the decision meshes with
other decisions or the cumulative impact of the
decisions by all ALJs. 191
Professor Flanagan returned to these themes and the other
themes of his first article in a second article published three years
after the first article. In this second article, Professor Flanagan
writes:

191

omitted).

Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1399 (footnotes
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[D]ebate over ALJ finality has moved to a more
sophisticated level as experience has been gained with
this issue. This Article probes some of the arguments
in favor of ALJ finality, including the need for ALJ
independence, the claims that agencies misuse their
review powers, and the need to address litigant
dissatisfaction with administrative adjudication. In
my opinion, neither ALJ independence nor the central
panel concept requires ALJ finality. Data from an
extensive study in North Carolina indicates that
agency review is not being abused, nor will ALJ
finality cure litigant dissatisfaction.
Finally, proposals have been advanced to
address some of the adverse consequences of ALJ
finality. Some suggest that the agency should present
its policies during the contested case to ensure that
ALJs act in conformity with it. 192
With respect to the suggestion that the agency present its
policies to the ALJ during the course of the hearing, Flanagan argues:
The major disadvantage of ALJ finality is the
inevitable differences in policy and enforcement that
occur when the agency is responsible for enforcement,
but the final decision on any action is made by the
ALJ. This has occurred in the few federal agencies
with split-enforcement models, as well as the more
recent experience in Louisiana, where the ALJ makes
the final agency decision without any agency review.
There are procedures for identifying important policy

192

Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 403 (footnote omitted).
Professor Flanagan relies on Professor Daye’s study of cases in North Carolina to
support his argument that the agencies are not abusing their final decision
authority. See id. at 403 n.9 (citing Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law
Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1571 (2001)). But Professor Flanagan’s interpretation of Professor Daye’s
study draws inferences from the data that Professor Daye himself never drew.
Flanagan claims the study shows that agencies are not abusing their authority. See
id. at 403. Professor Daye never claims this.
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issues before the hearing. Can the problem of
inconsistent decision-making be addressed by having
the agency present its policy during the contested case
so that the final ALJ decision will incorporate the
agency’s policy and enforcement view? For several
reasons, I do not believe so. 193
Before continuing with Professor Flanagan’s explanation of
why he thinks presenting agency policy on the record during the
course of the hearing will not work, let us look briefly at what others
have said on this subject.
In 2005, the late Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr., author of a
five-volume treatise on Administrative Law—now in its third edition
and still current through its pocket parts—wrote on making agency
policy part of the record as follows:
Policy in adjudication requires that the facts compiled
in the hearing-level record adequately support policy
determinations and the justification for those
decisions. In the end, the administrative judges must
be responsible for the adequacy of the record for this
purpose. Fortunately, administrative law permits
administrative adjudicators to actively participate in
the development of the record.
Adjudication decides individual rights or
duties, consequently it focuses on facts related to the
specific dispute, “adjudicative facts,” and its
procedures are designed to serve this purpose.
Policymaking requires the development of more
general or societal facts, called “legislative facts.” An
agency needs legislative facts to support and justif
[sic] its policy conclusions. Obviously, the power to
identify and find those facts constitutes a considerable
part of the power to make policy. . . .
Flexible application of the traditional
evidentiary rules permitted in many administrative

193

Id. at 426–27 (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
2001.058(c) (West 2001); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2000)).
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adjudicative settings might go some distance to
facilitate a policymaking record. . . . Evidence clearly
relevant to a policy question, even if tangential to the
specific dispute, might then be admitted as relevant to
the general resolution of the controversy. 194
Professor Koch suggests that, in addition to freely allowing
the parties to present expert testimony to establish agency policy and
present necessary evidence on technical issues, the policymaking
record may be built through official, administrative, or judicial
notice, but that before an ALJ takes official, administrative, or
judicial notice of a fact, the ALJ should offer the parties an
opportunity for presentation of alternative evidence. 195 In support of
his assertion that the ALJ may build the policymaking record without
formal presentation of evidence through taking official,
administrative, or judicial notice of facts, Professor Koch quotes the
following language from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in the case
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.: “[I]t is well established that, as long as a
party has an opportunity to respond, an administrative agency may
take official notice of such ‘legislative facts’ within its special
knowledge, and is not confined to the evidence in the record in
reaching its expert judgment.” 196
According to Professor Koch, there is no good reason why an
agency cannot build a policymaking record by directing an ALJ’s
attention to appropriate materials and requesting that the ALJ take
official notice of them. 197
In addition, Judge Hardwicke, in his debate with Professors
Flanagan and Rossi, spoke in support of agency presentation of its
policies during the contested case hearing. Judge Hardwicke’s
remarks on making policy part of the record in the hearing, were, in
part, as follows:

194

Koch, supra note 167, at 726–27 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 729.
196
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
See id.
195
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Agency expertise in support of agency
decisions is placed upon the table at the hearing qui
audit decidet. He who hears decides, is the key
principle of our life and our law. To defer the final
decision back to the agency is, in effect, to give the
agency a second bite at the apple. In the central panel
system and similar systems that we’re familiar with,
adjudicatorial process is adversarial. . . .
Consequently, many states have placed a statutory
limitation upon the agency’s ability to overrule the
judge except for limited specific reasons. . . .
The truth of the matter is that we are trying to
prevent the agency head from overturning a decision
[every time it is one] with which he or she disagrees.
Neither the agency nor the respondent may be
agreeable losers; indeed the agency may believe that
the action would not have been pursued at all without
justification. Consequently, when the agency loses, it
may find reasons, or attempt to find reasons, policy
reasons or whatever, for reversing.
....
Agency policy, as well as the agency’s expertise, is
put on the table at the hearing through its staff of
experts. Agency policy is part of the law of the case
and part of the assignment of the judge to apply in a
given case. . . .
....
I think the policy positions of the agencies
should be put on the table at the hearing. . . . [I]f you
have a polluter, for example, that has been a very bad
apple, the local EPA has had trouble with this person
for years, and so on the fifth offense, it seeks the
maximum penalty, a fine of $50,000 a day and
$50,000 for each offense. I want the agency to come
before the administrative law judge, and detail this
record and recommend the fine and penalty. It seems
to me that those policy concerns must be put on the
table and it is there that they must be dealt with. Give
the malfeasor the opportunity to respond and deal with
it in that manner. I think that’s a far better and proper
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way to do it than by the in-house agency commission
head.
....
I distrust a situation where the policy problem is not
brought up until the hearing and [is then] decided by
one of the litigants. 198
To the contrary of Professor Koch and Judge Hardwicke’s
views that policy should be made part of the record, Flanagan argues
that the agency cannot adequately make its policies part of the record
of the hearing. 199 He argues that this is true because an agency
cannot always anticipate policy issues to be resolved and their proper
resolution before trial. 200 The agency may be able to anticipate
policy issues in repetitive, routine cases but cannot always anticipate
them in more significant cases. 201 Flanagan supports this statement
with two arguments. 202 First, he argues the policy articulated by
lower level or mid-level agency staff in making an initial decision
leading to a dispute underlying a contested case may not be “the
same as the policy that the [agency] leadership would apply.” 203
Second, he argues that “the facts reviewed by the staff in making the
[initial] decision” may not be “the same facts that the ALJ will hear
and determine in the contested case.” 204 Flanagan argues the more
difficult and important the case, the less likely it is the agency will
fully understand the facts and policy issues and their proper
resolution. 205 He also argues that low and mid-level agency
employees make the decisions that eventually lead to contested
cases. 206 He says they decide whether “to grant or deny a license or a
permit, or take other administrative action,” based on established

198

Flanagan, Rossi, Hardwicke, & Butler, supra note 120, at 200–01,

210–11.
199

Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 426–27.
Id. at 427.
201
Id.
202
See id. at 427–28.
203
Id. at 427.
204
Id.
205
See id.
206
Id.
200
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agency policies and precedent. 207 These policies and precedents do
not necessarily reflect what the leadership would do if the matter
were to come before them again for reconsideration. 208
Stated another way, Flanagan claims that information in
administrative adjudication increases over time, and agency staff may
not know all the relevant facts at the time it makes an initial decision
to grant or deny a license or permit or take other action. 209 Flanagan
notes that, “Obviously, the agency staff receive[s] some information
from [the opposing party]” before it makes its initial decision. 210
But, “this information is [often] indefinite and incomplete. . . . [T]he
facts have not been probed and proved in a trial-type proceeding . . .
.” 211 He states that, often, the evidence presented in the trial of the
case will be “substantially more detailed” than the agency staff
initially anticipated. 212 As long as there is any difference between
the facts initially presented to the agency and the facts ultimately
proved to the ALJ during the hearing, there may be uncertainty in
what applicable agency policies are. 213
Flanagan says agency staff may not always know agency
leadership’s preference on policies applicable to contested case
adjudication. 214 He argues that, “policy is the province of the agency
leadership.” 215 Because of time constraints, agency leadership often
do not involve themselves in the early stages of litigation. 216 Agency
leadership often do not take an active role in litigation until after the
litigation has ended because their heavy workload often prevents
their active involvement in a case until then. 217 For these reasons,
Flanagan argues that the agency needs an opportunity to review ALJ

207

Id.
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 427–28.
214
See id. at 427.
215
Id. at 428.
216
Id.
217
See id.
208
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decisions before they become final. 218 These arguments do not ring
true to me. I presided as an ALJ in complex cases (and sometimes
not-so-complex cases) for several agencies for over twenty years.
The agencies for which I heard cases routinely assigned their most
difficult and important cases to their best attorneys. These attorneys,
with whatever formal or informal discovery was needed, made
certain they understood the facts of the case and the policy issues to
be resolved before proceeding to trial.
Further, in all cases I heard, the agency attorneys had
obviously discussed any unique or unusual issues with agency topmanagement. I always found that agency attorneys knew the policies
that agency leadership wanted to follow at all stages of every hearing.
Further, in the more important cases, a high-level institutional agency
representative was present in the hearing room, sitting at counsel
table to confer with the agency attorney. Occasionally, an agency
attorney might seek a break or continuance to check applicable policy
with higher-level agency management after some unanticipated
evidence or arguments. I freely granted these postponements, and we
were always able to move forward (usually later the same day). If
necessary, I would entertain a motion to reopen the evidence at the
end of a hearing for the agency attorney or opposing counsel to put
on additional evidence of agency policy or other relevant matters. I
even did this once or twice on my own motion. Thus, if the agency,
its adversary, or I realized after the evidence closed that there was a
gaping hole in the record, we were able to deal with it by reopening
on a case-by-case basis as justice and sound case management
required. Although my experience in hearing complex agency cases
was mine alone, it was far from unique. The way I handled these
cases was largely based on the training I received at the National
Judicial College, which has trained many thousands of state and
federal ALJs in the techniques of conducting complex agency
adjudications. When I ran an early draft of this paper past the CPDC,
several of the directors and chief ALJs confirmed that this is the same
manner in which their ALJs conduct hearings of complex cases and
issues.

218

See id. at 428–29.
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Flanagan argues, “The fundamental problem with presenting
policy at the contested case is that it puts the proverbial policy cart
before the factual horse.” 219 He argues:
In the middle of the trial, not only are the facts
unclear, but also the ALJ, as finder of fact, may not
accept the testimony of the agency’s experts, or may
find that the [opposing party’s] views are better
presented or more persuasive. An ALJ with final
authority may adopt his own view of the . . . evidence,
subject only to limited judicial review. 220
The agency does not know whether agency policy will be
accepted. 221 Flanagan states that, “Requiring [agency] policy to be
fully developed and articulated [in the middle of a hearing] in the
absence of a fixed set of facts is inconsistent with the general
jurisprudential approach in our system that rejects the use of advisory
opinions.” 222
Flanagan’s argument concerning advisory opinions takes the
law out of context. The law concerning advisory opinions has to do
with court decisions based on an uncertain or hypothetical set of
facts. It has no application to the presentation of evidence by
litigants in a contested case. Further, responsible treatment of the
private litigant demands that the agency not bring or defend actions
against a private litigant when the agency’s position in the case does
not correspond to agency policy. As a matter of sound management
and to conserve resources, a responsible administrative agency will
take such steps as are needed to assure there is no breakdown in
internal communication between policymakers and staff. It is the
responsibility of the agency’s chief legal advisor to assure that the
agency understands what issues it is litigating and why before putting
the citizen to the expense of an unnecessary hearing. If the agency’s
discovery or other investigation of the facts shows that agency staff
denied a license or filed an enforcement action in conflict with

219

Id. at 428.
Id. (footnote omitted).
221
See id.
222
Id.
220
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policies of agency top management, the case should be immediately
dismissed without expending the resources necessary to bring it to
trial.
What Flanagan really seems to be objecting to is putting the
agency through the uncertainties of litigation. But these uncertainties
are in the nature of contested adjudications and it would be
inappropriate to eliminate them if, in fact, we are to continue to
resolve disputes between an agency and private litigants through
adjudication. To the best of my knowledge, no one has contended
that we should abandon that system.
At least in some central panel states, agency heads have used
their final decision authority not to correct occasional error but to
overturn virtually every central panel ALJ decision adverse to the
agency. For example, a North Carolina study documented the
following pattern of decisions by agency heads: 223
Calendar year ‘89
Number of
cases in which
52
ALJ ruled
against agency
Number of
cases in which
agency head
upheld the ALJ 4
ruling against
agency
Percentage of
cases in which
agency head
8
upheld the ALJ
ruling against
agency (%)

‘90

‘91

‘92

‘93

‘94

‘95

‘96

‘98

30

23

38

35

27

53

34

37

4

3

2

7

5

1

5

6

13

13

5

20

18

2

15

16

The data in this chart was contained in a study by the North
Carolina General Assembly, Legislative Services Office, Research
Division, which was presented to the North Carolina Joint Legislative

223

SHUPING, N.C. GEN. ASSEM. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 114, at 11–50.
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Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee. 224 The data
strongly indicates that most of the agencies were using their review
authority to change central panel ALJ findings and conclusions in
virtually every case that they did not win before the ALJ instead of
only occasionally overruling ALJ decisions to correct clear error.225
One of the questions I will ask in the survey for Part II of this Article
is whether other central panels have kept records on the number of
times the agencies have turned around the central panel ALJ rulings
against the agencies in comparison to the total number of times the
central panel ALJs have ruled against the agencies. I will report this
information for every jurisdiction for which statistics are available to
find out whether the North Carolina statistics are typical. I am also
hopeful that a data collection system can be established to collect this
information regularly in the future, in as many central panel
jurisdictions as possible, for use in the event it is needed for future
analysis. This issue is critical and demands further study if the
administrative adjudication system is to maintain its legitimacy in the
eyes of the public.
In his unpublished essay, Allen C. Hoberg, Director of the
North Dakota OAH, states that North Dakota agencies have
sometimes abused their authority to change the hearing officer’s factfindings and conclusions. 226 He says that this has occurred most
often in cases involving pro se litigants, since the agencies know
from experience that pro se litigants generally lack the resources and
understanding of the court review process to appeal their cases to the
courts when the agencies overturn the hearing officer’s factfindings. 227
John DiLorenzo (a private attorney who practices before the
Oregon Central Panel) and former Oregon Central Panel Chief ALJ
Thomas E. Ewing, collected data from the Oregon Central Panel
which showed an unusually high incidence of agencies overruling
ALJ decisions that held against the agency. 228 Reviewing the data

224

Id.
See id.
226
Hoberg, supra note 86.
227
Id.
228
See John DiLorenzo, More Independence Needed for ALJs, ADMIN. L.
NEWSL. (Or. State Bar, Admin. Law Section, Tigard, Or.), Fall 2008, at 4, 5.
225
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collected by Mr. DiLorenzo and Chief ALJ Ewing, Oregon Central
Panel ALJ David Marcus wrote,
Based on the data he was provided by the
OAH, Mr. DiLorenzo raises legitimate concerns about
the final decisions rendered by agencies. In that
sample of 452 cases, ALJ’s [sic] issued only 42
proposed orders contrary to the agency’s original
notice of proposed action, and of that number more
than half were overturned by the agency in its final
order. Those numbers clearly raise concerns about
fairness in the final order process. As was noted at the
most recent meeting of the OAH Oversight
Committee, however, better and broader statistics are
needed to form a clearer picture of what is actually
happening in all agencies for which the OAH conducts
hearings but issues only a proposed order. 229
I will similarly be looking for a clearer picture of what is
going on in the agency review process through better and broader
statistics of central panel final decisions in the survey information to
be reported in the second and final part of this paper.
Ignoring the North Carolina General Assembly, Legislative
Services Office, Research Division statistics and the other materials
cited above, Professor Flanagan argues that only anecdotal evidence
supports the claim that agencies sometimes misuse their review
authority. 230 He argues there is also anecdotal evidence that some
ALJs misuse their authority. 231 While I would not be surprised to
learn that this might be true in some instances, Flanagan bases his
claim that some ALJs abuse their authority on survey information
collected by unspecified central panels showing that attorneys and
other participants in the central panel hearing process rated the
majority of assigned ALJs as “excellent or good,” but rated other
ALJs as only “fair, poor, or very poor.” 232 It seems a stretch to
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Marcus, supra note 153, at 2.
Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 421.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 421–22 n.108.
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assume that these rankings imply misuses of authority. In any
system, some judges will be more competent than others. Without
additional data, I would interpret this survey information as reflecting
more on the competence of individual ALJs than as documentation
that they have committed abuses of their authority.
The central panel ALJs lack the built-in conflict of interest
that the agency heads have, and this makes central panel judges—at
least theoretically—fairer and more reliable final decision makers
than the agency heads. The agency head conflict arises through the
agency head’s dual role as both head of the litigating agency and
final decision maker in the adjudications that come before him or her.
Philip Elman, a former member of the Federal Trade
Commission, wrote persuasively about the need to eliminate this dual
role. 233 He stated, based on his own experience, that this conflict of
interest exerts a strong influence on agency head decisions and
argued that this influence often threatens to interfere with a fair
hearing for the citizen. 234 Commissioner Elman stated:
On the basis of my own experience and
observations, the strongest argument I would make
against agency [head] adjudication of alleged
violations of law is that the blending of prosecutorial
and adjudicative powers in a single tribunal imposes
intolerable strains on fairness. The problem of
avoiding prejudgment, in appearance or in fact,
constantly hovers over all agency activity and is
troublesome to agency members in almost every kind
of action it takes. It can arise in the most subtle as
well as obvious forms.
Consider, for example, the so-called test case
in which the agency issues a complaint in order to
establish a new legal principle or remedy . . . .
Agency members frequently take an active part in the
pre-complaint investigative and prosecutorial phases
of these cases, and the complaint is usually issued

233

See Philip Elman, A Modest Proposal for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A. J.
1045 (1970).
234
See id. at 1048.
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with the knowledge that, because of the novelty and
importance of the issues, it will be fully litigated and
be back for adjudication on the record.
When the test case does come up on appeal to
the agency members, while there is no bias or
prejudgment of guilt in the classic sense, there is an
inescapable predisposition in favor of the agency
position as set forth in the complaint. After all, the
whole point of starting a test case is to let it go
forward into the reviewing courts where the issues
may be finally settled. To put it bluntly . . . one
should ask for long odds before betting against
issuance of a final order. While a test case may be
and usually is vigorously contested, the result—at
least in the agency phase—is likely to be a foregone
conclusion.
Indeed, in such a case an agency member may
vote for an order not so much because he is personally
convinced that there is a violation of law but because
he feels . . . that since it is a test case involving a
doubtful or unsettled question of law, his duty is to
find against the respondent so that the case may go on
to the courts for a definitive resolution. This Catch-22
process may reach full fruition when conscientious
judges on the reviewing court affirm the agency
ruling, whatever their own doubts about its merits,
because they feel obliged to defer to the agency’s
expert judgment and discretion.
There are other institutional factors that intrude
upon fair and impartial agency adjudication.
Theoretically, when an agency member sits as a judge,
his freedom to decide is the same as if he were on a
court. But the judicial process is designed to insure
that the judge is both neutral and disinterested and that
he has no interest other than that of applying the law
fairly and evenhandedly. An agency member, on the
other hand, cannot be unconcerned with whether the
outcome of the case is to advance or to retard an
important agency program to which substantial
resources have been committed. Even the most
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conscientious regulator cannot, when he acts as judge,
ignore the effect which the decision will have on the
agency’s regulatory policies and goals.
Moreover, an agency member cannot escape
the implications of his leadership role in the agency.
He may fear the effect on staff morale if he votes to
dismiss the complaint or reject the agency position in
an important case. 235
Professor Flanagan says three significant questions should be
asked before deciding whether to place final decision authority with
the central panel ALJ or leave it with the agency. 236 These questions
are:
What are the relative qualifications of the agency and
ALJ to interpret and apply the law in administrative
adjudication? What consequences flow from selecting
either the agency or the ALJ [as the final decision
authority]? Should the final decisionmaker be one
entity, the agency, or be one or more ALJs in a central
panel who may have differing perspectives on the law
and regulations [governing the agency]? 237
I submit that there is an additional and much more important
question, which Professor Flanagan overlooks: Is the ALJ or the
agency head most likely to provide both the citizen and the agency
with a fair hearing, both in appearance and in fact? This question
should be the primary consideration in allocating final decision
authority.
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Id. Similarly Newton Minow, Chair of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) under President Kennedy, wrote a letter upon his resignation
recommending that the FCC be stripped of its adjudicative authority. See Newton
N. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 ADMIN.
L. REV. 146 (1963). In addition, at his resignation, Louis J. Hector, Chair of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) under President Eisenhower, recommended that
the CAB be stripped of its adjudicative authority. See Louis J. Hector, Problems of
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
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Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 423.
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In addition, the added expense of a redundant agency review
of all the evidence supporting a neutral panel ALJ’s recommended
decision—and the extra time this review consumes—should also
weigh heavily in deciding whether to allow the ALJ decision to
become final, subject to court review, or to require a final agency
review in which the agency may change the outcome of the
adjudication.
Written with respect to a very specialized form of
administrative adjudication in the field of immigration law, Stephen
H. Legomsky’s article, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice:
Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 238 makes arguments worthy of
consideration in the wider context of administrative adjudication. In
the article, Professor Legomsky addresses the argument that there is a
need for final agency head review of ALJ decisions to assure
consistency of decisions as follows:
These arguments are not . . . compelling . . . .
[C]onsistency, while important . . . does not require
the agency head’s intrusion into the adjudicative
process. When there is a designated [agency in-house
review mechanism], an en banc decision . . . can yield
the same consistency as agency head review.
Congress could even authorize the agency head to
require the appellate tribunal to go en banc in a
particular case if there is a concern that an overworked
adjudicative tribunal would not do so on its own.
The need for agency primacy over policy
matters can be conceded, but again, agency head
review is not essential to agency policy primacy.
Rulemaking and other policy mechanisms are also
available. The multiple experts from whom the
agency head can distill advice and perspectives will be
just as available in a rulemaking proceeding as they
are in agency head review of adjudication. The
agency head will be just as capable of asserting
agency policy primacy via rulemaking as he or she
would be via review of adjudication. And rulemaking
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will be just as effective in promoting agency policy
coherence as review of an adjudicative decision would
have been—more so, if anything, since the facts of a
particular case will not constrain the reach of the rule.
...
While I acknowledge that even adjudicative
decisions will often require policy judgments . . . the
basic functions of the adjudicators are, after all, to find
facts, interpret law, and exercise specific statutory
discretionary authority. Even when a case presents an
important policy question, the agency head can
supersede the decision by issuing a generally
applicable regulation if he or she wishes—provided,
of course, that Congress has delegated the relevant
rulemaking authority to the agency head. If Congress
has not done so, then Congress’s inaction is itself a
policy decision that requires respect.
....
Moreover, the central rationale [usually given]
for agency head review—the agency’s political
accountability—is also precisely what makes agency
head review affirmatively troublesome. The agency
head and any subordinates to whom he or she
delegates the review function are subject to popular
and political pressures. On matters of policy that
reality is not problematic; consideration of the
public’s preferences is at home in democratic theory.
But the essence of the adjudicative function . . .
generally requires independence, not political
accountability . . . .
....
To sum up: There is little need for agency head
review. Decisional consistency can be achieved
through a combination of the administrative appellate
process, legislative rules (including interim rules when
necessary), and interpretative rules. Rulemaking and
other powers can also preserve agency policy primacy
and agency policy coherence. Moreover, agency head
review poses inherent dangers to the dispensation of
justice, including especially the substitution of a
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political outcome for one based on an independent
adjudicative tribunal’s honest reading of the evidence
and the law. 239
My experience in Texas confirms that the approach of
insuring consistency through en banc ALJ decisions works in
practice. At the mid-point in my career, I was general counsel to the
Texas Comptroller, the late Bob Bullock. We had from five to seven
or eight ALJs on our staff who adjudicated all state tax cases—the
number of ALJs appointed at any given time varied according to
agency caseload, backlog requirements, and available appropriations.
When the ALJs came up with conflicting decisions as to when or if a
tax was due on a particular type of transaction and under particular
facts and circumstances, we would have them sit en banc to arrive at
a single decision, which would be the way the issue would be
handled in all future cases. The process worked well, was perceived
as fair by the attorneys practicing before the Comptroller and the
ALJs themselves, and led to consistency in decisions. It also kept
Comptroller Bullock from personally intervening in the adjudicative
decision-making process. There is no reason that central panels
cannot also achieve consistency through en banc decisions by
representative panels of judges—if desired by less than all judges in
the larger central panels to avoid the unnecessary delay and expense
associated with an unwieldy number of judges working on the same
problem. It would solve the inconsistency problem that Flanagan is
concerned about and would be fairer to the citizen than it would be
for the head of the agency litigating against the citizen to make the
final decision. It would also be consistent with maintaining good
staff morale among the ALJs.
Flanagan states that he has had conversations in which ALJs
“suggest[ed] that some [state] agencies are . . . resisting legitimate
direction by the executive or legislative branches” of state
government and have become “independent power centers.” 240 This
phenomenon, known in the literature as “regulatory capture,”
describes a situation in which the agency begins to represent the

239
240

Id. at 458–59, 461, 462.
Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425.
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industry it is supposed to regulate rather than the public. 241 Flanagan
makes a tie-in with an article by Professor Jim Rossi:
Professor Jim Rossi . . . noted that state
governments have special characteristics that
influence the development of state administrative law
and central panels. As compared to the federal
system, state legislative sessions are shorter, staff
resources are fewer and special interests more
prominent. The state executive branch is weaker and
has less power to develop [agency] policy than the
President. In a jurisdiction with a weak governor [in
terms of his or her ability to monitor and exercise
control over agency activities] and a short legislative
session, an agency with broad jurisdiction or
important subject matter authority may be insulated
from legitimate executive or legislative oversight by
an independent political base. In this context, a
central panel with ALJ finality may become a
legislative
tool
to
counterbalance
agency
independence by transferring final adjudicative
authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ.242
In the opinion of this paper’s author, transfer of final
adjudicative authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ may
serve to restore the balance in favor of the public interest. 243
In addition to the reasons for the unique problems leading to
regulatory capture by industry at the state level noted by Professor
Rossi, the late Professor Arthur Earl Bonfield attributed these
problems, in part, to the tendency of state legislatures to place
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See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342–44 (2013).
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Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425 (footnote omitted) (citing
Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 551, 557–59, 568–72 (2001)).
243
See id.

Fall 2013

Final Decision Authority and the Central Panel ALJ

549

members of regulated industries on the boards of the agencies that
regulate them. 244 He writes:
[Conflict of interest problems in state
regulatory agencies] are significantly more severe than
those created on the federal level . . . . [M]any state
boards are formally structured to represent particular
interests [dentists serving on dental boards, realtors on
real estate boards, morticians on funeral regulatory
agencies, etc.], a situation that is more unusual in the
federal administrative process. 245
Flanagan does not view ALJ finality as a good way to control
and restrict regulatory capture. 246 He says if other state legislatures
were to adopt ALJ finality in all agency adjudication, it would be the
wrong thing to do. 247 It would adversely affect all agencies without
regard to the degree to which individual agencies have or have not
been properly responsive to executive and legislative leadership.248
Flanagan argues any benefit from weakening the agency by creating
an alternate power center in the central panel would be
counterproductive. 249 Flanagan does not satisfactorily explain why
he believes this. 250
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See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative
Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 128 (1982).
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Id.
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See Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425.
247
Id. at 425–26.
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Id. at 426.
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See id.
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One of the early reviewers of this paper has suggested that if final
decision authority were to be transferred from agencies to central panel judges,
private industry could then simply capture the central panel judges and achieve
regulatory capture in that way. While, in theory, this might be true, it would be
more difficult for an industry to capture generalist central panel ALJs than it would
be for industry to capture an agency charged with regulation of only particular
subject matters of interest to a particular industry. Chad M. Oldfather explains in
Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 861 (2012),
that regulatory capture of specialized agencies and adjudicators is easier than
regulatory capture of those with a broader jurisdiction. This is because people
outside the industry are likely to pay little attention to selection and appointment of
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Flanagan says, in some jurisdictions, ALJ finality has been
“proposed as an expedient remedy for litigant frustration with agency
adjudication.” 251 He argues that it would not help much. 252 He
argues that litigant frustration is mainly “based on the high agency
success rate in contested cases.” 253 He states that ALJ finality “will
not significantly affect this rate.” 254 In support of this argument, he
cites Professor Daye’s North Carolina study. 255 The study found that
ALJs “decided in favor of the agency three quarters of the time.”256
Therefore, Flanagan concludes, few cases would have different
outcomes using ALJ finality. 257 Flanagan argues that, “The real
reason for litigant frustration is that agencies generally bring actions
in which they are most likely to prevail. 258 Only by changing the
substantive law would litigants prevail more often in administrative
adjudication.” 259 Flanagan argues that if the law were changed, the
agencies would know not to bring actions that did not have a chance
under the new law, so even that would not help. 260
To the contrary of Professor Flanagan’s hypothesis that
litigant dissatisfaction with the administrative hearing process would
likely be unchanged no matter whether the ALJ or the agency was in
charge of determining the facts and law so long as the litigant lost the
final decision, 261 Christopher B. McNeil surveyed participants and
officials in isolated fields of regulation in which only the industry has much
interest. Id. This allows those with an interest in the regulated field to exercise
more influence in the selection of regulatory officials than they could exercise in
selection of officials with broader jurisdiction. See id.
251
Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425–26. He cites Oregon and
North Carolina as examples. Id. at 426.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
See id. at 419–20 (citing Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative
Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2001)); see also id. at 426 (incorporating the earlier discussion
of Daye’s results into the analysis).
256
See id. at 426.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
See id.
261
See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text.
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their counsel in drivers license revocation hearings conducted in New
York, Florida, and California (where presiding officers in
administrative hearings to revoke drivers licenses are in-house
agency employees), and Maryland, Oregon, and Texas (where the
presiding officers in administrative hearings to revoke drivers
licenses are central panel ALJs not connected with the drivers license
agencies). 262 He found that regardless of outcome (most of the
drivers lost), the drivers’ level of satisfaction with the hearing
process was significantly higher in those jurisdictions in which the
presiding officers were perceived to be independent of the drivers
licensing agency. 263
C.

The Rossi Articles

Professor Rossi has written two law review articles on central
panel ALJ final decision authority. 264 He argues that ALJ finality
increases ALJ independence, but that it also decreases agency
accountability. 265 This decrease results from the agency’s lack of
opportunity to review and correct “bad” ALJ decisions. 266 Rossi says
the resulting split of executive authority between the agency and ALJ
raises constitutional concerns. 267 However, he concedes this split of
authority probably does not violate either state or federal
constitutions. 268 Rossi proposes to restore the proper balance
between the ALJ and the agency. 269 He wants to alter judicial review
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See Christopher B. McNeil, Perceptions of Fairness in State
Administrative Hearings, 92 JUDICATURE 160 (2009).
263
See id. at 162–64; see also Christopher B. McNeil, PERCEPTIONS OF
FAIRNESS IN AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS: APPLYING LIND & TYLER’S THEORIES OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TO STATE EXECUTIVE-BRANCH ADJUDICATIONS (2008).
This is a more complete version of McNeil’s study. It was McNeil’s dissertation
for his degree as Doctor of Philosophy in Judicial Studies at the University of
Nevada, Reno.
264
Rossi, Final Orders On Appeal, supra note 3; Rossi, Final, but Often
Fallible, supra note 3.
265
Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3, at 54–55.
266
See id.
267
See id. at 55, 66.
268
See id. at 64–66.
269
Id. at 66.
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standards to give greater weight to agency law and policy positions
and less weight to the law and policy the ALJ applies to decide the
case. 270
I have read through both Rossi articles several times. I have
heard Professor Rossi explain the views he expresses in these articles
in person. I have also read Professor Flanagan’s explanation of
Professor Rossi’s views. 271 I must nonetheless confess that I still
find the methodology Rossi wants the reviewing court to apply
confusing, particularly insofar as to how it would differ in practice
from what would occur if the courts just used the same procedure
reviewing courts customarily now use to review agency decisions.
Flanagan has commented on Rossi’s views extensively. 272 He says
that “Rossi’s proposal requires the reviewing court to evaluate the
ALJ’s final decision . . . against the agency’s policy and legal
framework . . . .” 273 He says that “the agency’s policy and legal
framework . . . includes the predicates for [the agency’s] positions,
the agency goals, its regulatory values, and their relative weight . . .
as articulated in the record and agency briefs.” 274 The reviewing
court would apply the substantial evidence or clearly erroneous
standard of review “to determine whether the ALJ’s policy decision
was arbitrary and capricious, or clearly erroneous.” 275 If the ALJ’s
policy decision conflicted with the agency’s policies, “the court
would be free to overturn it in favor of the agency’s position.” 276
Flanagan states that,
Making the agency’s policy the gauge in reviewing the
ALJ’s policy decisions restores the agency’s role in
policy development, provides it an incentive to
carefully articulate the policy in the contested case, and
ultimately makes the agency accountable for the

270

Id. at 72–73.
See Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 428–30.
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decisions made by the ALJ, even though there was no
formal agency review of the ALJ’s decision. 277
Although Flanagan supports Professor Rossi’s effort, he doubts that
the effort will succeed. 278 Flanagan has two main problems with
Professor Rossi’s proposal. 279
First, it relies on judicial review and only a “few cases . . .
reach the appellate courts.” 280 Flanagan notes that, “the first appeal
in state administrative law is to a trial court,” which normally does
not render a written opinion. 281 Only a few cases move from the trial
court to an appellate court, which will render a written opinion.282
Although the cases in which written opinions are rendered “may be
the more important ones,” there will probably be too few of them to
provide much guidance. 283 Further, “The appellate process . . . is
particularly slow, and there may be months, if not years,” before the
appellate courts rule on the issues presented to them. 284 Flanagan
states that,
At best, changing the standards of review will
provide an opportunity in a few cases to reverse a
particularly egregious deviation of policy. Such cases
may stand for the general principle that agency policy
should prevail, but these appellate proclamations will
be so few that they will be only guideposts, and will
not serve as an effective means of insuring that ALJs
do follow the appropriate policy.
The policy
established by the ALJ will be dominant simply
because few cases are appealed. Agency appeals of
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some cases are possible, but it is not practical or cost
efficient to do so in every appropriate case. 285
Second, Flanagan is also concerned that the reviewing court
will only intervene on the side of the agency if the ALJ’s rulings on
applicable policy and law “substantially deviate” from the agency’s
views of applicable policy and law. 286 But, what is more likely is
that policy differences between ALJ and the agency will be
substantial, but not unreasonable enough to cause a reviewing court
to reject the ALJ’s decision. 287
Flanagan also states that he sees some other significant
problems in altering standards of judicial review. 288 Usually, judicial
review standards are established by statute instead of common law.289
Flanagan thinks it unlikely that a legislature that established ALJ
finality and a diminished agency role would turn around and increase
the agency’s power in adjudication by altering judicial review
standards in the agency’s favor. 290 He thinks the courts would have
little incentive to alter standards in the agency’s favor. 291 Flanagan
also notes that it is not certain that a change in standards, even if it
could be accomplished, would be meaningful. 292 Although there are
“subtle distinctions” in the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous
standards, “it is not clear that they actually produce significant
differences in the results.” 293
Flanagan says, in the end, the change of the standards of
appellate review would alter the outcome of too few cases to have
any significant impact. 294 The agency would be “dependent on two
independent actors, the ALJ and the courts,” to enforce its views on
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law and policy. 295 Flanagan argues that the agency could therefore
“legitimately disavow responsibility for the law” and policy as
developed in adjudication. 296
XI.

NEAR CONSENSUS THAT ALJS SHOULD HAVE FINAL DECISION
AUTHORITY IN SOME CASES

In a surprise ending to his second article, Professor Flanagan,
who in the remainder of his writings on final decision-making by
central panel ALJs, has adamantly opposed the concept, writes:
Another option, perhaps the best one, is to
consider ALJ finality in the context of specific
programs and specific contested issues. . . . State
administrative law is characterized by a vast range of
contested cases from the most complex multiparty
environmental matters to simple hunting license
revocations. ALJ finality may be appropriate for
some types of cases. Recent history shows that some
states have adopted it for a few programs, and
agencies have relinquished their review authority for
some matters.
The factors to be considered in making this
decision are those that emphasize the strengths of the
ALJ and at the same time, eliminate or moderate the
adverse consequences of ALJ finality to the agency.
The ALJ’s strengths are in providing procedural
regularity, evaluating factual evidence, resolving
conflicting evidence, and determining credibility. The
agency’s contributions are its subject matter expertise,
institutional experience with those regulated, and
authority to make policy. The best cases for ALJ
finality are those requiring determination of well
defined issues of historical fact . . . perhaps involving
credibility determinations, where the ALJ applies (but
does not make) established policies to those facts.
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Driving license cases are one example of this
class of cases . . . . These, and comparable cases, are
primarily fact determinations of recurring enforcement
scenarios where policy issues have long been
identified and resolved through regulation and
precedent. These cases do not have any significant
need for agency review because they are unlikely to
raise or to require the development or modification of
agency policy.
Agency review provides little
additional benefits after a hearing before the ALJ and
may delay any judicial review. 297
Michael Asimow has also argued for many years that not all
ALJ initial decisions should receive agency review. He has written
on this subject as follows:
Agency review of initial decisions made by
administrative judges is costly. It occupies the time of
the staff members who process the appeals and of the
agency heads who must decide whether to affirm
summarily or to hear arguments and receive briefs in
the cases. The consideration of appeals in individual
cases may distract agency heads from other important
business, such as making enforcement policy,
supervising the enforcement staff, considering
proposed rules or proposed legislation, or engaging in
economic analysis of the future of the industry that the
agency is supposed to regulate. The burden of
deciding adjudicative appeals may be substantial,
especially where the agency heads are part-timers.
Moreover, the agency appeal stage can be
quite time-consuming; it can delay a final decision by
months or years, with possible damage either to public
or private interests. Thus, it would seem that both the
effectiveness or regulatory programs and the
efficiency with which the agency discharges its
functions could be promoted by diminishing the
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number of appeals with which the agency heads must
contend. Yet most [California] APA agencies and the
State Personnel Board give some consideration to
every proposed decision; other agencies make agencylevel review available as a matter of right if either
party requests it.
. . . [I]f a case (or a particular class of cases) is
relatively unimportant (in terms of the regulatory
program), involves no significant issues of policy or
discretion, or presents purely factual issues, it might
be a wiser allocation of agency resources to supply
only a fair initial hearing without an agency appeal. . .
. Appeals in such relatively minor cases are unlikely
to be successful, so that losing an [in-house agency]
appeal remedy should not be, and should not seem,
unfair to litigants; instead, dispensing with agency
head review will speed up the administrative process,
avoid the need to pay attorneys to engage in a
probably fruitless exercise, and allow truly disgruntled
litigants to get to court more quickly. 298
Professor Daniel J. Gifford, in his article, Adjudication in
Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure,
discussed earlier in this paper, 299 also argues that there are some
cases, which do not merit agency review, in which the ALJ decision
should be final subject to an appeal to the courts. 300
Further, in a recent article published in a Canadian law
journal, Professors Michael Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers state
their support for a federal central hearing agency that would have
jurisdiction over Social Security issues and, perhaps, other
administrative hearings involving medical benefit determinations.301
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Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure
Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1109–10 (1992)
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They state that their initial research indicates that the central hearing
agency decisions should be final except for court review without
appeal to the agency based on a cost-benefit analysis that they say
seems to show that providing appeals within the agency would not be
cost efficient. 302
As I shall discuss in Part II of this paper, the main issue
causing the ALJ organizations—NAALJ, the CPDC, and NCALJ—
not to support the 2010 MSAPA was the failure to include an option
for the legislature to delegate ALJ final decision authority in at least
some cases, as had been done in a 1997 ABA Model Act for Creation
of Central Hearing Agencies. Given what is a growing consensus by
the academic community that ALJ final decision authority is a
preferred approach in at least some cases, it is unfortunate that the
ULC and the ALJ organizations could not get together on this issue.
Perhaps it is time for the ULC, supporters of the central panel-related
sections of the 2010 MSAPA, and the ALJ organizations to put the
acrimony of their earlier debate on this issue behind them and
reevaluate the issue.
XII.

SUMMARY OF THIS PAPER

This has been Part I of a two-part paper on final decision
authority for central panel ALJs. Historically, in-house agency
employees were stand-ins for agency heads with the function of
conducting adjudicative hearings for agency heads when the agency
heads were otherwise occupied. They wrote proposed decisions
containing proposed fact-findings, conclusions of law, and their
recommendations for a final decision. This historical practice is
written into the federal APA, but is not binding on the states and can
be changed by state legislatures. With the creation of central panels,
a neutral ALJ to whom final decision authority may be assigned now
presides in hearings in the central panel states.
Although Professors Flanagan, Rossi, and Moliterno view
central panel ALJ final decision authority with alarm, they fail to
make a compelling case as to why—at least with respect to factfindings—giving central panel ALJs this authority would not be
preferable to the agency occupying the dual role of both litigator and
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final decision-maker. This dual role contains a built-in conflict of
interest that deprives the citizen of a neutral adjudication. Moreover,
there is a growing consensus among both academics and state
legislatures that final decision authority for ALJs (subject to court
review) is appropriate in at least some cases.
This paper has argued, in part, that the law review articles
opposing ALJ central panel authority rely on flawed arguments.
Three states—Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina—have
gone to final decision authority for ALJs on both law and fact in
virtually all cases. It is thought that a majority of the other central
panels in most cases that come before them still follow the traditional
practice of the ALJ making only recommended fact-findings and
conclusions of law, with the agency head making the final decision.
Part II of this paper will compile data from a survey with
regard to the extent to which central panel states have modified this
traditional practice and the extent to which the modifications have
been and may be under consideration in central panel jurisdictions.
Part II of the paper will also consider the basis for the ALJ
organization opposition to the 2010 MSAPA in more detail. It will
update previously published information on the individual central
panel jurisdictions.

